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INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of the modern class action, academics and jurists have 
struggled to articulate the precise scope of and rationale for this peculiar 
mode of litigation. In a certain sense, class actions give rise to an 
anomalous situation in the American tradition of civil adjudication by 
allowing one person to litigate the individual claims of an entire group of 
people in a single proceeding without their explicit endorsement of or 
participation in the litigation.1 Paradoxically, the absent class members are 
simultaneously full participants and total non-participants in the litigation. 
The academic literature examining this form of litigation has portrayed the 
class action at times as a savior, bringing about justice in an otherwise 
flawed system of individual adjudication,2 and other times as a villain, 
serving to artificially expand defendant liability and create a specialty 
practice for entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers.3 At the heart of these 
tensions lies an awkward mechanism for collective adjudication of 
passively enforced individual claims within a civil justice system largely 
designed for the purpose of vindicating actively pursued, individually held 
claims.  
Although there is little consensus in class action scholarship as to why 
this island of collectivism exists in a sea of individualized dispute 
resolution,4 there is near universal agreement that modern society 
necessitates the existence of some tool for the bringing of mass collective 
suits. Few doubt that “some litigious situations affecting numerous 
persons ‘naturally’ or ‘necessarily’ call[] for unitary adjudication.”5 The 
major issues in the class action debate center on how courts determine 
 
 
 1. Although the idea of some form of group litigation goes back to medieval England, that form 
of litigation was in fundamental ways distinct from the modern class action. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, 
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 4–7 (Yale Univ. Press 1987). 
 2. E.g., OWEN FISS, The Political Theory of the Class Action, in THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 122, 
122 (2003); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).  
 3. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 12–61 (1991); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 69, 82–84; see also Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and 
Unlimited Power of Courts, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1991) (arguing that aggregative 
litigation necessarily compromises the ideals of justice). 
 4. The class action differs from other multi-party joinder devices listed in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure because it allows for a lack of participation by affected litigants. Other devices, such 
as compulsory or permissive joinder of parties, joinder of claims, impleader, or intervention allow all 
parties whose interests are the subject of the litigation to participate in the adjudication. 
 5. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/2
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precisely when those situations arise and what control the class members 
retain over the adjudication of their individual claims. 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempts to provide at 
least some guidance in this regard. Rule 23(a) lists four requirements that a 
court must deem satisfied before certifying a class.6 The rule then specifies 
that if a case meets all four of these requirements, it must still fall within 
one of the three categories of class actions described in Rule 23(b).7 Only 
after satisfying this bifurcated examination can a case be certified as 
appropriate for class treatment. If a class is certified, depending on which 
of the Rule 23(b) categories the case falls within, the rule provides class 
members with the opportunity to leave the class and go it alone, or 
withholds that opportunity from absent class members.8 
Because it is merely a rule of procedure, not surprisingly Rule 23 fails 
to provide a comprehensive theory of the class action’s role and function. 
In light of the significant practical consequences that flow from class 
certification for potential litigants, however, scholars have sought to 
provide guidance on this issue, proposing a range of normative models of 
the class action aimed at promoting the procedure as a means for attaining 
broader legal or social ends. 
The scholarly debate over these proposed class action models has 
focused primarily on the comparative social and economic costs and 
benefits associated with the various possible roles for Rule 23.9 This sort 
of analysis has perpetuated the view of the class action, implicitly 
embraced by many scholars, as a legal device that is appropriately 
subjected, all but exclusively, to legal analysis.10 Nothing, however, could 
be further from the truth. 
On one level, of course, Rule 23 is nothing more than an elaborate 
joinder device that facilitates the application of legislatively enacted or 
common law created substantive causes of action within a broader system 
of civil dispute resolution. Viewed in this light, the class action is in reality 
far less than what scholars have perceived it to be: a device to 
simultaneously achieve social justice, redistribute wealth, and transform 
 
 
 6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also discussion infra Part I. 
 7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see also discussion infra Part I. 
 8. In some circumstances, depending on which of the Rule 23(b) categories the case falls 
within, Rule 23 either provides the judge with discretion to direct some degree of notice to absent class 
members, or requires the judge order notice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A), 23(c)(2)(B).  
 9. E.g., Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of 
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993); Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 105–16. 
 10. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 126–27. 
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the nature of the entire adjudicatory process.11 They have viewed the class 
action in this manner, despite the fact that, under the express terms of the 
Rules Enabling Act, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure may not alter or 
modify underlying substantive rights.12 On another level, however, the 
class action is considerably more than what legal scholars have generally 
conceived it to be. Because the class action imposes collectivist 
treatment—often coercively—on the adjudicatory process by which 
individually held rights are vindicated or protected, it inescapably 
implicates some of the most important debates of modern political theory. 
Yet only rarely have legal scholars even acknowledged the implications of 
the modern class action for the foundational issues of normative political 
theory.13  
Just as the Truth in Lending Act requires creditors to disclose the terms 
and costs of a loan to potential borrowers,14 this Article seeks to identify 
the framework of political theory underlying each doctrinal or conceptual 
model of the modern class action. We do so in order to enable potential 
adherents of each approach to fully recognize and understand the political 
consequences that inexorably flow from acceptance of one or the other of 
the proposed legal models. Acceptance of any legal model of the class 
action requires acceptance of the underlying normative political judgments 
that inspire its creation. The choice of a legal model of the class action 
represents, at least implicitly, judgments on important normative 
controversies of political theory, carrying profound consequences beyond 
those appearing explicitly within the four corners of the class action rule. 
In this Article, we examine structural legal models of the class action 
proposed by leading legal scholars, from two distinct perspectives. The 
first perspective can be characterized as analytical and taxonomical. It 
seeks to categorize each of these proposed models in terms of normative 
political theories that, we assert, are necessarily implicated by the various 
models. The second perspective can best be described as normatively 
critical. On the level of political theory, we reject all of the existing 
scholarly models because all of them ignore or reject core notions of 
liberal individualism which, we believe, underlie American liberal 
democracy in general and the adversary system of litigation in particular. 
 
 
 11. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 2; Rosenberg, supra note 2; David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The 
Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998); discussion infra Part III. 
 12. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
 13. The two arguable exceptions are FISS, supra note 2, and Rosenberg, supra note 2. Neither 
article, however, recognizes or deals with the foundational competing political theories potentially 
triggered by use of the modern class action. See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.C. 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/2
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We then fashion our own proposed model of the class action, which we 
call the “individualist” model, that seeks to fashion a legal framework of 
the class action that fosters the values inherent in a commitment to liberal 
individualism. Because one must understand the consequences associated 
with a political theory in order to appreciate its impact, we initially 
describe the various political theories implicated by the modern class 
action debate. We take as a baseline a traditional liberal political theory, 
grounded in a basic commitment to a belief in the worth and integrity of 
the individual as a core participant in a democratic society. We then 
compare liberalism with the political theories implicated by the existing 
scholarly models of the class action. 
Of particular significance in the class action debate is the emphasis that 
liberalism places on an individual’s right to personal autonomy.15 The 
concept of “personal autonomy,” however, is ambiguous. In its most 
extreme manifestation, the concept embodies traditional libertarian 
precepts of wide-ranging individual choice, free from control or direction 
by the state. In shaping our liberal individualist model of the class action, 
however, we need not commit ourselves on foundational issues of 
substantive libertarianism. Because the class action is an adjudicatory 
device, the only area of individual choice necessarily implicated by our 
theoretical model is a type of meta-decision making that focuses on what 
we call “process-based autonomy.” This concept refers to the category of 
decisions individuals are able to make concerning the nature of their 
participation in the democratic process or their efforts to influence the 
decisions made by democratic institutions. This form of autonomy is to be 
distinguished from substantive autonomy, which concerns individuals’ 
freedom to make decisions concerning the conduct of their day-to-day 
existence. Pursuant to the concept of process-based autonomy, individuals 
are deemed to possess autonomy over decisions about how to participate 
in the process of collective decision making concerning such substantive 
decisions. Thus, individuals have autonomy to determine what they will 
say in an effort to influence the political process or the manner in which 
they will attempt to petition the government for redress of grievances. 
Liberal democratic theory—as well as American constitutional law—for 
the most part insulates these decisions from external control. Individuals 
who resort to the adjudicatory process in order to vindicate or protect their 
substantive legal rights are appropriately viewed as simply additional 
manifestations of the political meta-autonomy that forms a central element 
 
 
 15. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of liberal democratic theory. A class action rule that disregards these 
protective participatory rights dangerously undermines the proper role of 
autonomous individuals within a liberal democratic civil justice system. 
After elaborating upon liberal theory, we then contrast the emphasis on 
individual political autonomy in this political theory with the alternative 
approaches to political theory that are implicated in the class action 
debate: utilitarianism,16 communitarianism,17 and civic republicanism.18 In 
each case, the subordination of the individual to external considerations 
conflicts with the normative importance placed on process-based 
individual autonomy by liberal theory.  
We then consider the implications for political theory of the class 
action models proposed by leading legal scholars. We reject all of these 
models for their failure to recognize the central role of the individual in the 
political and judicial processes. A class action model premised upon 
liberal theory will permit abandonment of process-based individualism 
when, and only when, to employ collective treatment would—
paradoxically—further precepts of individual choice. Certainly individuals 
may always voluntarily elect to act collectively, and in some cases the 
prohibitive cost of bringing an individual claim would, as a practical 
matter, preclude individuals from pursuing their claims without pooling 
their resources as part of a class. While those claims are still retained by 
the individual class members, it is generally understood that when a small 
injury is inflicted upon a large number of people, resort to the class action 
may be the only way for the individual class members to recover for their 
injuries.19 The liberal model of the class action that we propose suggests 
the need for a sliding scale measure by which to determine the validity of 
class action treatment. This scale is tied to considerations related to the 
size of the individual claims at stake and a rough prediction about the 
corresponding ability of individuals to vindicate their private rights by 
individual pursuit of their claims.  
We have two goals in this Article. Initially, we seek to alter the nature 
of the class action debate, by expressly inserting the perspective of 
political theory. Recognizing how the modern class action is structured 
may have significant consequences for the foundations of normative 
political theory, we hope to remove the theoretical superficiality that has 
 
 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 19. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 905 (1987). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/2
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characterized much of the modern scholarly debate concerning class 
actions. While on occasion that debate has touched on questions of 
political theory, those references are generally superficial or misguided. At 
the very least, then, we hope to establish that acceptance of one or the 
other of the scholarly models of the class action necessarily brings with it 
significant political baggage. Second, we hope to convince the reader that, 
when viewed from this perspective, all class action models that have been 
proposed to this point should be rejected because they ignore, undermine, 
or dilute fundamental notions of process-based individual autonomy. 
I. CLASS ACTIONS UNDER RULE 23 
A. Class Certification and the Right to Opt Out 
We begin with a brief overview of the basic features of the class action 
as set out in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though 
certain aspects of the rule have been altered over the years, in terms of 
basic framework Rule 23 is largely unchanged from the major overhaul it 
underwent as part of the 1966 civil rules amendments.20 A class action 
requires a would-be representative plaintiff to make a successful motion 
for class certification.21 If the class is certified, the class representative acts 
on behalf of the entire class, functioning in a fiduciary capacity. The 
outcome of the litigation will legally bind not only the class representative, 
but every member of the class. In the motion for class certification, the 
plaintiff is not expected to establish the merits of the lawsuit, but rather 
only that his “allegations, if assumed to be true and to state a valid cause 
of action, are suitable for class treatment and resolution.”22 
Rule 23 requires that the proposed class satisfy a list of requirements. 
This involves a two-step inquiry. Initially, potential class representatives 
must demonstrate that they meet each of the four 23(a) prerequisites: (1) 
 
 
 20. See generally Kaplan, supra note 5, at 375–400 (describing the 1966 Federal Rules 
Amendments impacting class actions). 
 21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). A recognized subset of class actions has served as a source 
of significant controversy in recent years for their focus of class certification as an end in and of itself 
rather than the initial step in the process of class litigation. These so-called “Settlement Class Actions” 
occur when the would-be class representatives and the parties opposing the class collaboratively seek 
certification of a class on the condition that the district court approves a predetermined settlement 
arrangement. See generally Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the 
Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
545 (2006) (arguing that settlement class actions violate Article III’s case or controversy requirement). 
 22. STUART T. ROSSMAN & DANIEL A. EDELMAN, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, 
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS § 9.1.3.1, at 104 (5th ed. 2002). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the number of potential class members must be so large that the use of 
permissive joinder is impractical (“numerosity”); (2) the class must share 
common questions of law or fact (“commonality”); (3) the claims of the 
class representative must be typical of the entire class (“typicality”); (4) 
the class representative must be capable of adequately representing the 
interests of the entire class (“adequacy”).23 Upon establishing these four 
conditions, the litigant moving for class certification must show that the 
suit falls within at least one of the three categories of class actions 
described in Rule 23(b).24 The differences among these categories may 
have great practical significance because the categories afford different 
levels of protection for and impose different restrictions on absent class 
members. One category of class actions, those brought pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(3), allows absent class members to “opt out” of the litigation. For 
classes in which absent class members possess the right to opt out, class 
representatives are burdened with the obligation to provide notice to as 
many absent class members as is practicable.25 Other categories, however, 
do not automatically require class representatives to shoulder this burden, 
because class members are not permitted to withdraw from the class. 
These classes are described as “mandatory.”26 
The first of these different categories is the 23(b)(1) class, which is 
subdivided into two sub categories: the (b)(1)(A) class and the (b)(1)(B) 
class. The (b)(1)(A) class includes those instances in which the defendant 
could potentially face inconsistent obligations if individual claims were to 
be litigated separately.27 The (b)(1)(B) class, on the other hand, applies 
when the interests of the individual claimants could be undermined by 
separate adjudications.28 The classic example of this appears when a 
defendant has a limited fund from which to pay damages, and the total of 
the individual claims is likely to exceed the fund.29 For both (b)(1)(A) and 
(b)(1)(B) classes, membership in the class is mandatory, with no 
requirement of notice.30  
 
 
 23. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 24. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 25. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
 26. A district court has discretion to require notice even in the cases of mandatory classes. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2). 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). For a discussion of how the (b)(1)(A) class functions in practice, 
see In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).  
 29. These are informally known as “limited pie” situations. E.g., Baker v. Wash. Mut. Fin. 
Group, LLC, 193 Fed. Appx. 294 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/2
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The second category of class action is provided for in Rule 23(b)(2), 
which applies to instances in which the relief sought is primarily or 
exclusively injunctive or declaratory relief applicable to the class as a 
whole.31 The paradigmatic example of a (b)(2) class is a civil rights 
litigation where a defendant has acted in a way generally applicable to the 
class as a whole.32 As in the case of (b)(1) classes, (b)(2) classes are 
mandatory with no notice required.33 
The final category of class suit is the Rule 23(b)(3) class. For these 
cases, class certification does not follow directly from the interwoven 
nature of the interests at stake in the litigation, but would “achieve 
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of 
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural 
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”34 Plaintiffs seeking 
class certification as a (b)(3) class must demonstrate that questions of law 
and fact “predominate” over the individual issues in the litigation.35 They 
must also show that litigation as a class is “superior” to other forms of 
adjudication.36 Rule 23 provides judges determining predominance and 
superiority with a list of four factors to consider in making their 
evaluation: (1) the interest of absent class members in directing the 
litigation of their claims in separate actions; (2) the existence of ongoing 
litigation concerning the class; (3) the desirability of having all litigation 
adjudicated in one forum; (4) the potential difficulties in managing the 
class.37 For class actions falling within Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must 
provide notice to absent class members and absent class members must 
have the opportunity to opt out of the litigation.38 
The companion to the notice requirement in (b)(3) classes is the class 
members’ right to opt out of a class action, an option unavailable in all 
other categories of class actions. An opt-out system differs from an opt-in 
system in its treatment of absent class members’ inertia. Under an opt-out 
system, absent class members are presumed to be part of the class, while 
under an opt-in system, they are presumed to have elected not to 
participate in the class litigation absent their affirmative act to include 
themselves. The practical difference is that under an opt-in system passive 
 
 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 32. E.g., Holland v. Steele, 92 F.R.D. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
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class members retain their individually granted rights to sue, but under an 
opt-out system defendants are typically subjected to greater damage 
awards due to the larger class size.39 No category of class action under the 
current federal rule provides for an opt-in procedure. Classes are either 
mandatory or, under (b)(3), opt-out in structure.  
B. Positive and Negative Value Class Actions 
An additional subject discussed in the class action literature concerns 
the size of the individual claims at stake in the class litigation. Scholars 
have noted a significant distinction between two types of class actions 
based on the size of individual class members’ claims.40 Type-A class 
actions, or “Positive Value” class actions, include those class actions 
where individual claims are sufficiently large so that “each claim would be 
independently marketable even in the absence of the class action 
device.”41 Type-B class actions, or “Negative Value” class actions, on the 
other hand, refer to those class actions where the costs in establishing and 
collecting the individual claims are greater than the potential recovery.42 
The importance of this distinction lies in the alternative rationales 
typically offered to justify inclusion of the claims in a class proceeding. 
The standard argument in favor of negative value class actions is that 
absent the class proceeding, these claims would never be brought because 
it would be economically inefficient to do so on an individual basis.43 By 
authorizing class treatment of negative value claims, a class action rule is 
thought to achieve distinct goals. First, it enables individual claimants to 
obtain compensation when such relief would have been otherwise 
infeasible. Second—and, to many commentators, far more important44—
allowing litigation collectivization in these situations effectively enforces 
existing substantive legal restrictions on private or governmental 
 
 
 39. The significance is not merely theoretical. Few potential class members ever opt out of a 
class action. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 10 
(1996) (“Across all four districts, the median percentage of members who opted out of a settlement 
was either 0.1% or 0.2% of the total membership of the class. . . .”). 
 40. Coffee, supra note 19, at 904–06. 
 41. Id. at 904. 
 42. Id. at 905. Professor Coffee also describes a third category of class actions, the Type-C class 
action, which occurs when the class includes absent class members with both Type-A and Type-B 
claims. Id. at 905–06. Specific consideration of this type of class action is unnecessary for the analysis 
presented in this Article. We propose an alternative version of “Type-C” class action. See discussion 
infra Part IV.B.2. 
 43. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 19, at 904–06. 
 44. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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offenders. In the case of positive value class actions, however, the 
rationale typically offered is that they minimize the expenditure of 
resources by consolidating all claims into a single proceeding and 
avoiding duplicative litigation.45  
II. POLITICAL THEORIES RELEVANT TO THE CLASS ACTION DEBATE 
While Rule 23 sets out the existing legal framework of the modern 
class action, surely its contours do not exhaust the scope of potential 
normative debate over the scope and structure of the class action. There 
are many ways the class action device may be structured, and Rule 23’s 
dramatic revision in 1966 underscores the fact that the provision is always 
subject to normatively based reconsideration and modification. The 
tension among competing normative judgments about the costs and 
benefits of the class action become clear only through an intensive 
examination of the underlying political theories implicated by the various 
proposed normative models of the device. Most class action scholars have 
ignored the political theory implications of the class action models they 
advocate. Yet the political theory implicit in the various proposed 
structures can speak volumes about their merits.46 
In order to make the consequences of these theoretical ties explicit, it is 
first necessary to provide a brief description of the various political 
theories implicated by the class action debate. What becomes immediately 
obvious is that only liberal theory emphasizes the role of the individual in 
controlling the legal pursuit and protection of his individual interests. The 
other major political theories implicated by modern class action 
scholarship view individualism either as an irrelevancy, a consideration 
unworthy of significant emphasis, or even as a morally deleterious 
consideration. An exhaustive study of the nuances suggested by these 
political theories is beyond the scope of this Article. Yet by examining 
how the basics of each political theory respond to fundamental questions 
about the state, government, politics, and justice, we are in a better 
position to understand how each of these political philosophies has dealt 
with what should be seen as the central issues of the modern class action 
debate. In this section, we explore the basic elements of the four political 
theories implicated in the legal scholarship of class action commentators: 
 
 
 45. E.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class 
Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 819 (2006). 
 46. See discussion infra Part III. 
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liberalism, utilitarianism, democratic communitarianism, and civic 
republicanism. 
A. Liberalism 
Although there are many often conflicting variations, liberal political 
theory generally emphasizes the centrality of the individual’s personal 
growth, integrity, liberty, or all three. The worth of the individual is 
central to Kantian moral philosophy,47 and is assumed to be fundamental 
in John Stuart Mill’s more instrumental justification of liberalism.48 Under 
these versions of liberal philosophy, the primacy placed on the worth of 
the individual dictates recognition of the individual’s role in the 
functioning of the democratic state.49  
1. Autonomy, Liberal Theory, and the Democratic State 
While the various subcategories of liberal theory differ in a number of 
ways, at some level most recognize the centrality of some form of 
individual autonomy. John Rawls provides a useful definition of autonomy 
by asserting that people are autonomous when they “act[] from principles 
that they would acknowledge under conditions that best express their 
nature as free and equal rational beings.”50 Although this view of 
autonomy has not been universally accepted,51 the subtle distinctions in 
the outer reaches of autonomy are beyond the scope of this Article.52 At its 
foundation, autonomy dictates a significant level of free choice for the 
individual on issues of some consequence to him, unfettered by coercive 
external forces, either governmental or private. Of special concern to us, 
however, is the fundamental dichotomy between alternative visions of 
 
 
 47. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS 62 
(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Longmans, Green & Co. 5th ed. 1916) (1873) (“A rational being 
must always regard himself as giving laws either as member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends 
which is rendered possible by the freedom of will.”). 
 48. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 63 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859). 
 49. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 250 (1971). 
 50. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 515; see also IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 51–52 (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1959) (1785). 
 51. Gerald Dworkin, for example, has also focused on the conditions surrounding the exercise of 
decision making in defining autonomy by claiming, “[a] person is autonomous if he identifies with his 
desires, goals, and values, and such identification is not itself influenced in ways which make the 
process of identification alien to the individual.” Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE 
INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 61 (1989). 
 52. See also discussion infra Part IV.B. Whether these distinctions would impact how a model of 
the class action derived from liberal theory would be constructed is a subject best left for another day. 
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individual autonomy, rather than its generic application. Democratic 
theory, we believe, recognizes a foundational distinction between process-
based autonomy and substantive autonomy. 
Process-based autonomy refers to the ability of individuals to control 
the nature of their participation in the processes of collective democratic 
government.53 The concept, in other words, refers to the individual’s 
ability to make decisions about her efforts to influence the collective 
decision-making process—or “meta-decisions.” Examples of these meta-
decisions include whether, when, and how to speak publicly on a political 
issue, petition the government for a redress of a grievance, participate in a 
political campaign, or vote. The extent of one’s process-based autonomy 
determines how much control an individual has over decisions impacting 
both how one participates in the democratic process and the ways in which 
one attempts to influence the decisions made by democratic institutions. 
By way of contrast, substantive autonomy refers to the more general 
power of individuals to make decisions directing the course of their lives. 
This broader category of decision making includes choices that individuals 
make as part of their private lives, unconnected to direct participation in 
the democratic process. Examples include whom to marry, where to work, 
whether to have an abortion, or whether to use narcotics. Depending upon 
how broadly one chooses to define the concept of substantive liberty, the 
concept may extend beyond such relatively intimate, personal choices to 
also include individual decisions that simultaneously impact the interests 
of other members of society, such as whether to sell automatic weapons, 
pay workers a living wage, or test a new medication before placing it on 
the market. 
Recognizing and understanding the dichotomy between process-based 
and substantive autonomy is central to a full understanding of liberal 
theory. Liberal theory, in the narrow form we employ, is by no means 
necessarily synonymous with libertarianism. Instead, on most issues of 
substantive autonomy, liberal theory—again, in the narrow incarnation 
that we advocate—is wholly agnostic. What liberal theory is not agnostic 
about is the need for commitment to core notions of individual autonomy 
in deciding how to participate in the processes of democracy.54 In contrast, 
 
 
 53. Nearly all democratic theorists recognize the indispensable role of individual participation in 
political institutions in a legitimate democratic state. E.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL 
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PEOPLE 9 (1960). 
 54. Cf. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 285 (1942) (noting 
that in a democracy “the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule 
them”).  
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the libertarian branch of liberal theory, associated primarily with the 
scholarship of Robert Nozick, calls for nearly limitless protection of 
substantive individual autonomy. Nozick proposed that the state may only 
restrain autonomy for the “protection against force, theft, fraud, 
enforcement of contracts, and so on . . . .”55 Anything beyond those 
restrictions violates the core right of the individual because individuals 
properly enjoy virtually total autonomy over their actions.56 This approach 
erects individual autonomy as a nearly impenetrable barrier against state 
intrusion and has been relied upon to support the legalization of all 
narcotics and prostitution, as well as the abolition of taxation.57 
Rawls takes a more expansive view of the appropriate role of the state 
in restricting autonomy, determined by means of a thought experiment he 
calls the “veil of ignorance.”58 This model assumes that in a state of nature 
called the “original position” and behind a “veil of ignorance,” where an 
individual is presumed to be unaware of his social status in future society, 
the individual would choose a rule limiting individual autonomy; then the 
state may legitimately restrain that exercise of autonomy.59 Rawls believed 
that this inquiry leads to his so-called First Principle, which requires that 
individuals be given as much liberty as possible so long as each member 
of society enjoys the same degree of liberty.60 The legitimacy of 
inequalities in liberty among individuals resulting from state intervention 
is determined on the basis of their conformity to Rawls’s Second 
Principle, which posits that these inequalities must satisfy two conditions: 
(a) they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members 
of society; and (b) they are to be attached to positions and offices open to 
all, under conditions of equality of opportunity.61 He calls this “the 
 
 
 55. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974). 
 56. Nozick’s libertarian philosophy is closely tied to John Stuart Mill’s earlier idea of the “Harm 
Principle,” which claims the state may only coerce the will of its citizens to the extent necessary to 
prevent harm to others. MILL, supra note 48, at 91. Mill claimed that “the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” Id. 
 57. It is worth noting, however, that Nozick later described some of his views as “seriously 
inadequate” and appeared to recant aspects of his extreme form of libertarianism. ROBERT NOZICK, 
THE EXAMINED LIFE 286–96 (1989); but see An Interview with Robert Nozick, The Robert Nozick 
Pages (Jul. 26, 2001), http://www.juliansanchez.com/nozick/jsinterview.html (“[W]hat I was really 
saying in The Examined Life was that I was no longer as hardcore a libertarian as I had been before. 
But the rumors of my deviation (or apostasy!) from libertarianism were much exaggerated.”).  
 58. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 136–42. 
 59. Rawls argues that the basis for any such restriction “can be defended only if it is necessary to 
raise the level of civilization so that in due course these freedoms can be enjoyed.” Id. at 152. 
 60. Id. at 250. 
 61. Id. at 83. 
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difference principle,” which serves to allow a limited amount of state 
interference in individual autonomy where doing so serves the interests of 
justice.62  
It is true that Nozick and Rawls failed explicitly to recognize the 
process-based/substantive dichotomy when crafting their theories. 
However, both theories are at least consistent with, even if not expressly 
confined to, a commitment to process-based autonomy. The minimalist 
state advocated by Nozick, for example, would find little reason for 
restricting the ability of individuals to control their meta-decision making.  
Arguably more complex in this regard would be Rawls’s use of the veil 
of ignorance construct. It is perhaps conceivable that some restriction on 
process-based autonomy could be imposed if it would be legitimately 
selected by those in the original position. But Rawls’s First Principle 
would seem to preclude the possibility of imposing such a restriction from 
behind the veil, because it suggests that people would select a procedure 
that takes away their ability to direct the course of their personal 
interactions with the institutions of democracy. Rawls proceeds on the 
assumption that individuals behind the veil would be risk-averse about 
threats to their liberty, preferring procedures that maximize individual 
autonomy over the sort of authoritarian procedures that allow process-
based autonomy to be exercised by someone other than the individual. 
Thus, the notion that any branch of liberal theory would allow for a 
legitimate subjugation of an individual’s process-based autonomy is 
highly dubious.63 A legitimate liberal-democratic government requires that 
individuals be autonomous when participating in governmental processes 
and seeking to influence the decisions of democratic institutions.  
 
 
 62. Id. at 75–78. 
 63. Even in the “New Liberalism” of L.T. Hobhouse, which has been described as 
“communitarian liberalism,” such a restriction would not appear to be justifiable. See Alan Ryan, The 
Liberal Community, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV 91, 95 (John W. Chapman & Ian 
Shapiro eds., 1993). Under this form of liberal theory, which arguably justifies a more extensive role 
for the state in regulating individual autonomy, the state may limit the decision making power of an 
individual any time where doing so would prevent an individual from exerting coercion over other 
members of the community. L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 63 (Batoche Books 1999) (1911). Yet any 
argument that would use Hobhouse’s liberal theory to justify the restriction of an individual’s 
procedure-based choices in the civil justice system would have to show that those decisions have the 
effect of constraining another person’s ability to make similar decisions. Such an argument seems 
tenuous, at best. 
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2. Process-Based Autonomy, Adjudication, and the Adversary System 
To this point, we have established that liberal theory places great value 
on an individual’s autonomy over meta-decisions—that is, decisions about 
the nature, scope, and extent of the individual’s participation in the 
processes of collective decision making that characterizes liberal 
democracy. The most obvious forms of collective decision making 
affected by process-based autonomy are political in nature: attempts to 
persuade or influence other private individuals or governmental officials, 
participation in political campaigns, or voting. It is our position, however, 
that individuals’ attempts to protect their legal rights and interests by 
resort to the judicial process are also appropriately characterized as an 
exercise of process-based autonomy. The adversary system of adjudication 
is another governmental process that vests meta-decision making authority 
in individuals who seek to influence a governmental institution’s ultimate 
decisions that will impact their lives. Just as democratic theory 
necessitates the existence of process-based autonomy because it ties the 
legitimacy of governmental decision making to recognition of individual 
autonomy of participation, so, too, does the legitimacy of the adversary 
system rely on a judgment that individuals must be able to make 
autonomous choices about how best to pursue their own interests in court.  
Fundamental to the adversary system is a party’s ability to control fact 
development and the presentation of legal arguments.64 In the words of 
Lon Fuller, this “distinguishing characteristic” of the adversary system 
“confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the 
decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision 
in his favor.”65 The legitimacy of the outcomes produced by the adversary 
system rests on the notion that litigants will present their case to the court 
in the way they see fit. The selection of the adversary mode of dispute 
resolution confirms and fosters the American commitment to liberal 
theory.66 It recognizes the inevitability of differences of opinion in a 
pluralistic society on issues “involving both societal and individual needs, 
interests, and values.”67 As such, it embraces the notion of conflict and its 
orderly resolution, and legitimizes the outcome of this resolution process 
by providing litigants with control over the legal pursuit and protection of 
 
 
 64. Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 650 (1983). 
 65. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978). 
 66. Redish & Kastanek, supra note 21, at 576. 
 67. Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role of 
Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953–1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 366 (2001). 
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their interests.68 The liberal character of American civil adjudication stems 
from the presumption that in exercising this control, litigants are, in 
Rawls’s words, “acting from principles that they would acknowledge 
under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal rational 
beings.”69 The adversary system harnesses the ability of litigants to make 
autonomous decisions in legitimizing the outcomes it produces. 
Individuals are presumed to have no legitimate complaint if they were 
allowed to present their case in the way they chose to present it—or, to put 
it another way, had “their day in court.” 
Beyond a few rare, statutorily created exceptions,70 our adjudicatory 
system is largely predicated upon the idea of individualized adjudication 
for the purpose of vindicating or protecting the individual’s legally 
protected rights and interests. Indeed, Article III’s injury-in-fact 
requirement arguably reflects a belief that litigants should use private 
adjudication only to vindicate harms done directly to them.71 A litigant’s 
decision to pursue his private right to sue may operate in a way that 
benefits another party, but doing so must be incidental to the vindication 
of his own rights. The adversary system recognizes that although many 
people may share a common interest and wish to advance that interest, 
they may disagree about how best to advance it. They are therefore 
granted the authority, on an individual basis, to pursue those interests in 
the way that they see fit. Perhaps of greatest consequence, individuals 
are—within broad parameters—assigned the responsibility for the choices 
they make in how they pursue their claims. Litigants are burdened with the 
bars of collateral estoppel and res judicata for the outcome of the cases 
they litigate. Justifying the potentially harsh consequences of these bars 
reflects a presumption that litigants will have had the opportunity to 
present their case in the way they deem most effective. 
It is true, of course, that the discretion to mount one’s own case in the 
manner one sees fit is not absolute. Rules of ethics, laws of evidentiary 
admissibility, and the potentially competing interests of other potential 
litigants, among other restrictions, naturally constrain the scope of 
individual discretion in certain instances. But the same is true of even the 
 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 515. Gerald Dworkin has also focused on the conditions 
surrounding the exercise of decision making in defining autonomy by claiming “[a] person is 
autonomous if he identifies with his desires, goals, and values, and such identification is not influenced 
in ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to the individual.” Dworkin, supra 
note 51, at 54, 61. 
 70. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000) (statutory interpleader). 
 71. Redish & Kastanek, supra note 21, at 563–66. 
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most highly prized forms of process-based autonomy. Felons and those 
under the age of eighteen are generally denied the right to vote, and few 
consider the right of even politically focused expression to be absolute. 
But it does not follow that individual choice in such matters is of less than 
compelling significance. In the case of adjudication brought to vindicate 
private rights, a system that bound one litigant by the decision in a case 
over which another person had total control would run counter to the value 
placed on process-based autonomy. At a minimum, it would represent a 
highly paternalistic system, derived from an underlying assumption that 
someone else knows better how to vindicate individuals’ rights than the 
individuals themselves, even when those individuals would have 
affirmatively chosen to actively protect their own rights. It would surely 
be difficult to reconcile such presumptions with the dictates of process-
based autonomy inherent in liberal democratic theory. 
B. Utilitarianism 
The basic position of utilitarian philosophy is that the state has a duty 
to make decisions that will maximize happiness—“the greatest possible 
surplus of pleasure over pain”72—aggregated over all members of society. 
Utilitarian theory views the state’s primary function to be the promotion of 
the broadest possible “utility.” In the language of its recognized innovator, 
Jeremy Bentham: 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency 
which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of 
the party whose interest is in question . . . . [I]f that party be the 
community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a 
particular individual, then the happiness of that individual. . . . The 
interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests 
of the several members who compose it.73 
 
 
 72. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 413 (MacMillan 1907) (1874). 
 73. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2–3 (1988) (footnote 
omitted). Modern utilitarians appear to be in disagreement as to whether measuring the “total utility” 
created by an action means increasing the average utility of all the members of society or the sum of 
all utility amongst societal members. J.J.C. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in 
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 1, 27–28 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973). As this 
ambiguity does not impact the analysis of utilitarianism from a liberal individualist perspective, we 
skip over this problem, noting only that accepting the Utilitarian Model of the class action likely 
requires an answer to this question. 
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Since Bentham’s era, the vast literature dissecting utilitarianism has 
given rise to a seemingly limitless variety of nuanced approaches to the 
theory. Scholarship examining Bentham’s writing has described him as 
everything from a totalitarian to an individualist.74  
Bentham recognized that the interests of individuals would be both 
selfish and varied. As one scholar noted, Bentham “offered no hope that a 
man will act other than in pursuit of his own interests, and little hope that 
these interests will naturally be associated with the interests of others.”75 
In order to counterbalance the inherent selfishness of man, he proposed 
that legislators attempt to craft laws that would influence the behavior of 
the public to act in the general interest.76 But Bentham also stated that: 
The Legislator is not the master of the dispositions of the human 
heart: he is only their interpreter and their servant. The goodness of 
his laws depends upon their conformity to the general expectation. 
It is highly necessary, therefore, for him rightly to understand the 
direction of this expectation, for the purpose of acting in concert 
with it.77 
An effective lawmaker, then, must attempt both to project the desires 
of the individual members of society and enact laws reflecting those 
passions, while also crafting laws that would subordinate these hedonistic 
desires. This “individualist” aspect of utilitarianism focuses on the 
preferences of the individual members of society and recognizes that those 
preferences may differ. Yet it has been simultaneously recognized that 
utilitarianism also includes an authoritarian streak,78 since it allows justice 
 
 
 74. James E. Crimmins, Contending Interpretations of Bentham’s Utilitarianism, 29 CAN. J. POL. 
SCI. 751, 751 (1996). Bentham has been quoted as saying that: 
Liberty . . . not being more fit than other words in some of the instances in which it has been 
used, and not so fit in others, the less the use that is made of it the better. I would no more use 
the word liberty in my conversation when I could get another that would answer the purpose, 
than I would brandy in my diet, if my physician did not order me: both cloud the 
understanding and inflame the passions. 
Id. at 752 (citing DOUGLAS G. LONG, BENTHAM ON LIBERTY: JEREMY BENTHAM’S IDEA OF LIBERTY 
IN RELATION TO HIS UTILITARIANISM 173 (1977)). 
 75. R. Cranford Pratt, The Benthamite Theory of Democracy, 21 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 20, 
20 (1955). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 297, 
322 (Russell & Russell 1962) (1830). 
 78. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 
112 (1979) (“This formulation does not exclude the possibility that A may know B’s true preferences 
better than B does—the possibility, that is, of paternalism.”). 
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to be deeply paternalistic by requiring a lawmaker to determine what will 
make an individual happy.  
Individual autonomy is of no special importance in utilitarian 
philosophy. Even under a form of “individualist utilitarianism,” which 
does provide greater weight to the preservation of individual autonomy,79 
the value placed on self-determination reflects a judgment about the 
amount of utility derived from liberty, rather than recognition of any 
inherent value in individual choice and integrity. “The utilitarian legislator 
is said to value liberty because it is essential to each person’s happiness, 
and thus productive of the greatest happiness, and devises laws 
accordingly.”80 Again, the sole concern of the utilitarian is whether a 
policy will maximize the overall happiness present in society.81 Thus, to a 
utilitarian the protection or promotion of autonomy “is in itself of no 
special moral interest. Since as a rule people capable of autonomy want 
opportunities to live autonomously and find satisfaction in living 
autonomously, there is on utilitarian grounds abundant reason for 
increasing people’s opportunity to live in that way.”82 John Stuart Mill is 
perhaps the most well recognized “individual autonomy utilitarian,” in the 
way he justifies the preservation of individual autonomy on pragmatic, 
self-developmental grounds.83 Unlike the Kantian approach, which views 
individual autonomy as a first principle absolutely and unquestioningly 
shielded from government intrusion, Mill justifies the central role of 
individual choice solely on the basis of the value it serves in enhancing the 
happiness of the individual. Whatever one thinks of the Millian defense of 
autonomy, however, there can be little doubt that the bulk of utilitarian 
thought focuses not at all on the values of individual choice. 
More fundamentally, the fact that utilitarian theory regards individual 
autonomy as simply another factor among many illuminates the broader 
problem with utilitarianism in a political system premised on the existence 
of rights. In the words of Judge Posner:  
Rights in a utilitarian system are strictly instrumental goods. The 
only final good is the happiness of the group as a whole. If it is 
 
 
 79. E.g., Fred Rosen, The Origin of Liberal Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and Liberty, in 
VICTORIAN LIBERALISM: NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (Richard 
Bellamy ed., 1990). 
 80. Crimmins, supra note 74, at 755. 
 81. A source of disagreement among utilitarian theorists lies with whether happiness is measured 
in terms of an aggregate of individual happiness or the general happiness of the entire society. See 
Posner, supra note 78, at 113. 
 82. Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy and Utility, 95 ETHICS 5, 5 (1984). 
 83. See MILL, supra note 48. 
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maximized by allowing people to own property and marry as they 
choose and change jobs and so on, then rights to these things will be 
given to them, but if happiness could be increased by treating 
people more like sheep, then rights are out the window.84  
While this perception may be easily overstated,85 it is beyond dispute 
that utilitarianism is a philosophy “which judge[s] actions neither by their 
motives nor their intrinsic qualities, but by their consequences.”86 The 
broader point is that “[u]tilitarianism in itself does not make any class of 
actions categorically wrong; everything depends upon one’s guess about 
the effects of a policy upon the psychic state of millions of individuals.”87 
It is this communal aspect of utilitarianism that Rawls criticized in crafting 
his theory of justice.88 To utilitarians, the concept of the individual matters 
only insofar as individuals are deemed units for deriving measurements of 
utility.89 Utilitarian theory acknowledges the individual’s ability to choose 
what makes him happy and what does not, and will generally leave those 
preferences undisturbed. Yet if abridging the happiness of an individual 
will create greater happiness for others, then the individual’s will must 
give way to the interests of the majority.  
C. Communitarianism 
The modern strains of communitarian political theory function 
primarily as a response to Rawlsian liberalism, rather than as a single 
unified political philosophy.90 Perhaps reflecting this responsive character, 
the common characteristic of modern communitarian theorists is disdain 
 
 
 84. Posner, supra note 78, at 116. 
 85. A common method of criticizing utilitarianism is to point to the “parade of horribles” that 
may emerge from the utilitarian state. The father of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, did little to help 
his disciples in this regard as he once proposed eliminating begging by enslaving beggars. Id. Yet, in 
this regard, utilitarians frequently point out that, practically speaking, these sorts of horrible 
consequences are unlikely to ever occur as people typically do not derive sufficient pleasure from the 
suffering of others to allow such extreme results. See SMART, supra note 73, at 70–71. 
 86. Samuel Brittan, Two Cheers for Utilitarianism, 35 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 331, 334 (1983). 
 87. Christopher T. Wonnell, Problems in the Application of Political Philosophy to Law, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 123, 141 (1987). 
 88. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 26. 
 89. See David A. J. Richards, Rights and Autonomy, 92 ETHICS 3, 5 (1981) (“Utilitarianism . . . 
fails to treat persons as equals in that it literally dissolves moral personality into utilitarian 
aggregates.”). 
 90. That is not to suggest, however, that many of the core concepts of communitarian theory only 
emerged after Rawls. Aspects of communitarian theory date back as far as ancient Athens, and can be 
seen as a recurring theme in political theory. For the purposes of this Article, however, the focus is 
solely on the communitarian political philosophers who have offered distinct approaches over the last 
twenty years. 
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for liberalism’s overemphasis on individualism. This shared objection 
manifests itself in two largely distinct political philosophies with different 
approaches to the way communal will can constrain the autonomous 
decision making of the individual. We label the first of these approaches 
“democratic communitarianism,” a theory that vests the power of self-
determination in the community as a whole, rather than the individual, 
based on its belief in the primacy of social tradition and context in 
determining the identity and views of an individual. This approach does 
not predetermine what the substantive normative decisions made by and 
for the community should be, but instead posits that as a general matter, 
any attempt to define justice in a way that disregards broader communal 
interests, whatever those interests may be, is incoherent. The second of 
these approaches, which we call “objective truth communitarianism,” 
posits that there are objectively good and bad policy decisions and that the 
government has a responsibility to enact policies that promote the “good 
life” for all of society. This approach contends that government should not 
be neutral towards the views and actions of the public, but rather should 
steer society towards a predetermined ideal society, even if that requires 
the constraint of individual preferences.  
Each version shares a related disagreement with the normative 
conclusions associated with liberal theory. Yet their differing approaches 
to the means of incorporating the communal interests at stake raise distinct 
concerns. The democratic communitarians effectively subordinate the 
value of individual autonomy to the social institutions that shape the 
community as a whole. The objective truth communitarians, in contrast, 
allow justice to be defined by the purely political preferences of those 
who, for whatever reason, have been vested with the a priori power to 
define justice. Because modern class action theory appears to reflect only 
issues of process-based communitarianism, our theoretical inquiry here is 
confined to that aspect of communitarian theory. 
Democratic communitarianism, much like liberal theory, places value 
on a commitment to a foundational premise of societal self-determination. 
The theory rejects the notion that values exist beyond those determined by 
the society of self-governing citizens. In this important sense, the theory 
rejects any form of totalitarianism or authoritarianism. Thus, 
communitarians believe that society is best served by political decisions 
that reflect the preferences of the entire community.91 
 
 
 91. It is this aspect of democratic communitarianism that has led some commentators to label it 
as simply a new approach to “majoritarianism.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUSTICE x (1998).  
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In contrast to liberalism, however, democratic communitarianism 
views the community, rather than the individual, as the foundational 
democratic unit. The individual is seen only as a part of broader social 
institutions to which he is inescapably and organically connected. 
Democratic communitarians believe that the interests of society are best 
served by a state that adopts policies designed to promote the communal 
entities that shape an individual’s identity. Individual autonomy is to be 
protected only to the extent that doing so does not undermine these 
different communal attachments that play such an important role in 
shaping the life choices made by individuals. 
Democratic communitarianism rejects the importance that liberalism 
places on atomistic individual autonomy. Where liberals like Kant and 
Rawls argue that individuals have a supreme interest in selecting and 
pursuing the aims they deem important, democratic communitarians argue 
that individuals are defined largely by their various communal 
attachments. The ultimate result of this insight is that the policies selected 
by the state should not emphasize the protection of an individual’s ability 
to make autonomous choices, but should instead initially seek to sustain 
and promote the communal attachments that allow for the very sense of 
well-being and self-respect that lies at the heart of the justification for 
liberal individualism. Communitarian theory is grounded in the belief that 
individual autonomy divorced from the communal ties that shape that 
autonomy is incoherent. The reasons for the actions one selects are derived 
from the experiences shaped by communal groups that are often 
involuntarily or passively selected, such as racial, gender, or religious 
affiliations.92 They contend that government policies best further the 
interests of society by seeking to promote the interrelationship of 
individuals with society as a whole. 
At the heart of the communitarian argument lies a metaphysical view 
of an individual’s identity as bound up with each person’s various 
communal attachments. Charles Taylor has perhaps most clearly 
articulated this view of identity and why it requires a reconceptualization 
of the liberal view of justice.93 Professor Taylor advocates an Aristotelian 
 
 
 92. See CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1991); see also Robert C. Post, The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 685 (1990). 
 93. CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 187 (1985). It should be noted that “Atomism” is primarily a response to rights-based 
libertarian theorists in the Nozickian tradition, rather than a critique directly aimed at the sort of liberal 
individualism of Rawls. Rawls in fact does address the role of social organizations in shaping social 
identity in A Theory of Justice. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at Part III. This does not render Taylor’s 
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view of the individual as “a social animal, . . . because he is not self-
sufficient alone, and in an important sense is not self-sufficient outside a 
polis. . . . [Individualism] affirms the self-sufficiency of man alone . . . .”94 
Taylor considers liberal individualism flawed because it ignores the fact 
that “living in society is a necessary condition of the development of 
rationality . . . or of becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being.”95 
The autonomy contemplated by liberal theory “is a freedom by which men 
are capable of conceiving alternatives and arriving at a definition of what 
they really want, as well as discerning what commands their adherence or 
their allegiance.”96 He contends that this sort of autonomy can only be 
developed by the norms imposed by society as a whole. Further, the very 
desire to possess this sort of autonomy derives from “the developments of 
art, philosophy, theology, science, [and] the evolving practices of politics 
and social organization . . . .”97 He reasons that these institutions, which 
shape and provide meaning to the individual, “require stability and 
continuity and frequently also support from society as a whole—almost 
always the moral support of being commonly recognized as important, but 
frequently also considerable material support.”98 As a consequence,  
the free individual of the West is only what he is by virtue of the 
whole society and civilization which brought him to be and which 
nourishes him. . . . [A]ll this creates a significant obligation to 
belong for whoever would affirm the value of this freedom; this 
includes all those who want to assert rights either to this freedom or 
for its sake.99 
The consequence of this communitarian view of the self from a 
political theory perspective is that it elevates the importance of community 
to a level far higher than that of the individual alone. In the words of 
Professor Taylor: 
The crucial point here is this: since the free individual can only 
maintain his identity within a society/culture of a certain kind, he 
has to be concerned about the shape of this society/culture as a 
 
 
criticism of liberalism irrelevant, as subsequent communitarians have explained, because the extent to 
which Rawls incorporates the role of community in shaping identity is relatively minor.  
 94. TAYLOR, supra note 93, at 189.  
 95. Id. at 191. 
 96. Id. at 204. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 205. 
 99. Id. at 206.  
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whole. He cannot . . . be concerned purely with his individual 
choices and the associations formed from such choices to the 
neglect of the matrix in which such choices can be open or closed, 
rich or meagre. It is important to him that certain activities and 
institutions flourish in society. It is even of importance to him what 
the moral tone of the whole society is—shocking as it may be to 
libertarians to raise this issue—because freedom and individual 
diversity can only flourish in a society where there is a general 
recognition of their worth.100 
The failure that democratic communitarians like Taylor identify in 
liberalism lies with its promotion of an atomistic notion of the self that 
they believe to be metaphysically incoherent and to inspire hedonistic 
behavior. 
There are many flaws in the reasoning underlying democratic 
communitarianism. Initially, communitarians fallaciously treat the 
normative and the descriptive perspectives as interchangeable. As purely 
an empirical matter, it is of course true that individuals rarely, if ever, exist 
in atomistic isolation. None of us, after all, is Robinson Crusoe—and even 
he needed his companion, Friday. We all live within a broader society 
which, to a certain extent, shapes and frames us. It does not follow, 
however, that society should not be structured by an abstract normative 
commitment to recognition of the individual as an integral unit, worthy of 
respect apart from his communitarian associations. Indeed, it is for the 
very reason that the individual may so easily be overwhelmed by the 
society as a whole that the need to emphasize the importance of the 
individual’s growth and development is so compelling. A democratic 
society could not function effectively otherwise. Even modern civic 
republicans, who generally deplore the selfishness of the individual and 
instead value communal pursuit of the public interest, acknowledge that 
absent the opportunity for personal and intellectual growth the individual 
will be unable to function as an active participant in the governing 
process.101 The simple fact is that a community, ultimately, is composed of 
individual citizens. If society places no value on their worth or growth, we 
will be left with a community of automatons—hardly the basis of a 
democratic society, and hardly the appropriate building block for active, 
flourishing communal institutions. 
 
 
 100. Id. at 207. 
 101. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The 
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989). 
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It is quite conceivable that one could choose to prefer at least a diluted 
form of communitarianism over the extreme substantive libertarianism of 
Nozick. That is an issue that is beyond the scope of our inquiry. It is quite 
another thing, however, to choose communitarianism at the expense of the 
process-based autonomy that, we believe, lies at the heart of liberal theory. 
Absent a commitment to the individual citizen’s ability to make choices 
about the nature of his participation in the governing process or to protect 
his own rights and interests within that process legally unfettered by 
external communal forces, the concept of a viable democracy is rendered 
incoherent, because the concept of an active, thoughtful citizen will have 
become incoherent. It would therefore be nonsensical to commit to 
democracy as one’s chosen form of government without accepting the 
value of individual self-determination.102 A community is composed of 
individuals, and it is the free will of those individuals, acting individually 
or in association with others, that is exercised when policy choices are 
made. Without some foundational respect for the moral and intellectual 
integrity of the individual, any notion of democracy is ultimately rendered 
incoherent. 
D. Civic Republicanism 
Related to, but in an important sense distinct from, communitarianism 
is the revised theory of civic republicanism that surfaced late in the 
twentieth century. Although civic republicanism was originally tied to 
such morally distasteful precepts as racism, jingoism, and sexism,103 in its 
modern and streamlined form the theory has shifted dramatically to the 
political left. As revived by such leading legal scholars as Cass Sunstein 
and Frank Michelman,104 civic republicanism is characterized by its 
commitment to the deliberative pursuit of the public interest and disdain 
for the selfish, pluralistic pursuit of narrow personal interests.105 
Individualism, not surprisingly, is for the most part a political casualty of 
this focus. Because one of us has previously coauthored an extensive 
scholarly critique on the modern version of civic republicanism,106 we 
decline to mount such an attack here. Our present focus, rather, is on a 
 
 
 102. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 103. Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1665 (1988).  
 104. See generally Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
 105. See supra notes 99–100. 
 106. Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican 
Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV. 267 (1991). 
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comparison of civic republicanism to the various forms of 
communitarianism. 
In their disdain for the value of individualism and their focus on some 
sense of community, the two theories are clearly linked. However, 
communitarian theory does not appear to be as narrowly tied to pursuit of 
some political form of the public interest. Presumably, communitarian 
theory could find value even in more narrowly defined communities—
even those grounded in notions of self-interest, as long as the “self” in 
question is defined on a community basis. For example, the National 
Association of Manufacturers or the National Chamber of Commerce 
could presumably qualify for protection under at least some forms of 
communitarian theory, broadly defined. The same is definitely untrue of 
modern civic republican theory. Civic republicanism finds selfish pursuit 
of private profit-making interests to be harmful, rather than beneficial, 
whether the pursuit is individually or group based. 
III. LEGAL MODELS OF THE CLASS ACTION 
To this point, we have described four normative models of political 
theory: liberalism, utilitarianism, democratic communitarianism, and civic 
republicanism. While we have made no express mention of the 
implications of these theories for the nature or scope of the modern class 
action, our thesis is that: (1) the various normative approaches towards the 
class action that have been advocated by prominent legal scholars are best 
understood largely as manifestations of one or another of these broader 
political theories; and (2) when viewed from this theoretical perspective, 
each should be found wanting because of its improper departure from the 
fundamental norms of liberal theory, which value the process-based 
autonomy of the individual. Before one can recognize and comprehend 
these legal-political intersections, however, it is first necessary to 
understand the structures of the various legal models of the class action. It 
is therefore to that exploration that we now turn. 
We identify three class action models that illustrate the breadth and 
depth of legal scholarship on the normative rationale and proposed 
structure of the modern class action. We call the first of these models the 
“utilitarian justice” model, which is principally linked to the writings of 
Professor David Rosenberg. It relies on the belief that the common good is 
best served by a class action device that provides optimal deterrence in 
mass tort cases. Such deterrence can be achieved, Rosenberg argues, only 
by means of all-inclusive, mandatory classes. The second approach 
emerges from the writings of David Shapiro and Samuel Issacharoff, 
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which we label the “communitarian process” model. This approach seeks 
to view the class action largely as the adjudication of claims held by 
community-like entities, rather than as the aggregation of separately held 
individual claims. The final model, which we associate with Owen Fiss, is 
labeled the “public action” model. This approach views the class action 
exclusively as a device to vindicate the public interest by enforcing public 
rights against governmental or private offenders. From the perspective of 
the public action model, individual claimants are nothing more than the 
instrumental vehicle by which the public interest is legally vindicated. 
A. The Utilitarian Justice Model 
The “utilitarian justice” model of the class action seeks to utilize the 
class action as a mechanism for overcoming what are perceived to be the 
inefficiencies in the adversary system’s treatment of mass exposure tort 
claims by adjudicating all such claims that are individually held in the 
form of mandatory class actions. By requiring the aggregation of the 
individually held claims in mass torts, this model envisions a class action 
rule that facilitates the use of substantive tort law as an instrument for 
ensuring an optimal level of deterrence. Following in a long tradition of 
utilitarianism,107 the utilitarian justice model determines the 
appropriateness of the invocation of the class action procedure on the basis 
of an estimate of the overall societal utility to be achieved as a result.  
This approach was first described by David Rosenberg and it is in his 
scholarship that this model has been most clearly detailed and refined.108 
Rosenberg’s initial treatment of the class action came in an article in 
which he advocated a reconceptualization of tort law in mass exposure 
cases.109 Deeming the class action to be the “keystone” of a reformulated 
mass exposure tort system,110 Rosenberg focused his early work on its 
facilitative value in creating a tort system he believed would “enhance the 
system’s functional productivity considerably.”111 Rosenberg’s approach 
to the class action sought to deal with the problem that individual plaintiffs 
 
 
 107. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 831 n.1 (2002) (claiming that his theory of the class action draws on “theories 
of deterrence, insurance, law enforcement, rational choice analysis, and welfare economics”). 
 108. E.g., Rosenberg, supra note 2; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS 
TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 23 (1987). 
 109. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 905–08. 
 110. Id. at 907. 
 111. Id. at 908. Professor Rosenberg also discussed the importance of restructuring the nature of 
remedies as an important element of the “public law” system of tort liability in mass exposure cases. 
Id. at 916–24. 
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face in mass exposure cases in proving causation by a preponderance of 
the evidence. They are frequently unable to do this for two reasons. First, 
there exists a “problem of determining the origin of the victim’s 
disease.”112 When the injury in a mass exposure case involves illness, 
there are typically multiple possible causes of the disease. It is often true 
that collectively only a certain percentage of a particular class of injury or 
harm is caused by exposure to a defendant’s product, effectively rendering 
impossible determination of causation in the individual case. Usually, the 
most an individual plaintiff bearing the burden of proof is able to establish 
is a statistically higher rate of disease among those who have come into 
contact with the defendant’s product, and it is at best unclear how 
successful such a trial strategy would be. The second obstacle possibly 
facing mass exposure plaintiffs occurs because “it is often unclear which 
one of several manufacturers of a given toxic agent produced the particular 
unit of the substance that harmed the plaintiff.”113 Mass exposure cases 
often involve several manufacturers who make effectively identical 
products and potential plaintiffs will come into contact with products 
produced by more than one of these manufacturers. This makes it nearly 
impossible for individual plaintiffs to establish, by a preponderance of 
evidence, which factor actually caused his injury.  
The paradigmatic example of these problems of proof occurred in the 
Agent Orange litigation of the 1980s. In the years following the Vietnam 
veterans’ return, a number of them “died prematurely or reported 
debilitating illnesses or claimed that their children were born with serious 
congenital birth defects.”114 When the veterans linked their conditions to 
their exposure to the chemical agent known as Agent Orange, which had 
been employed as a defoliant during the war to clear parts of the Vietnam 
jungle, they faced both of the evidentiary problems Rosenberg identified. 
It was, as a practical matter, all but impossible for an individual plaintiff to 
prove that his particular illness had been caused by exposure to Agent 
Orange.115 Science was unable to definitively tie the various illnesses to a 
singular cause. Additionally, Agent Orange had been manufactured by a 
number of different chemical companies. It would be impossible to keep 
track of which chemical company’s “Agent Orange” had been used in 
 
 
 112. Id. at 855–56. Professor Rosenberg also noted that the problem is compounded by the 
prohibition of statistical correlation evidence as the sole basis for liability under the traditional tort 
system. Id. at 857 & nn.37–38. 
 113. Id. at 855–56.  
 114. SCHUCK, supra note 108, at 23. 
 115. Id. at 29. 
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which parts of Vietnam in order to establish individual causation by a 
preponderance.116 Yet despite these evidentiary barriers, it was at least 
conceivable that Agent Orange had, in fact, caused some of the illnesses 
suffered by the Vietnam veterans and their families. Judge Jack Weinstein 
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
addressed this problem by effectively implementing Rosenberg’s model 
through the process of inducing settlement.117 He cited Rosenberg’s 1984 
article and chose to certify the class, allowed statistical evidence to be 
introduced, and imposed damage scheduling once the litigation reached a 
settlement.118 
The Agent Orange litigation provides real-world support for 
Rosenberg’s key observation that in the mass tort context, the impact of 
the causation problem can cause potentially significant problems for 
individual plaintiffs. Yet under the restrictions of an individualized 
adjudicatory system, where the assessment of damages is preceded by the 
all-or-nothing assessment of liability on an individualized basis, the total 
damages assessed against that defendant are likely to be significantly 
lower than had the adjudication been classwide in effect. 
Rosenberg’s attempt to remedy this danger inspired his proposed 
“public law” reformulation of the tort system in mass exposure cases.119 A 
key element of this public law model was the use of the class action as a 
tool to achieve the broad objective of the tort system of deterring future 
tortious conduct.120 Rosenberg proposed a collectively based 
“proportionality rule” to replace the individualized case-by-case 
preponderance rule in mass tort cases. He argued that both compensatory 
and deterrence objectives would be better served by “impos[ing] liability 
and distribut[ing] compensation in proportion to the probability of 
causation . . . regardless [of] whether that probability fell above or below 
the fifty-percent threshold and despite the absence of individualized proof 
of the causal connection.”121 In practice, this would mean the use of 
statistical averaging and damage scheduling that would allow a class to 
recover a statistically determined amount if its members could establish an 
overall statistical probability that their illnesses were caused by exposure 
to a product, even if that probability would likely amount to less than a 
 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 143–67. 
 118. Id. at 270. 
 119. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 859–60. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 859. 
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preponderance in an individualized adjudication. Thus, even if certain 
especially resourceful plaintiffs or plaintiffs with unique circumstances 
would have been able to take advantage of an individualized system of 
adjudication, as a collective matter the class of plaintiffs as a group would 
benefit substantially from a unified form of adjudication. 
Rosenberg further noted that the causal connection problem is 
exacerbated by the institutional advantages defendants enjoy in a one-on-
one litigation system that allows them to litigate what is effectively the 
same case over and over again, while each plaintiff is forced to start from 
scratch.122 He argued that a system composed exclusively of individual 
adjudications allows “[t]he defendant firm, but not the plaintiffs, [to] take 
advantage of economies of scale in case preparation, enabling it to invest 
far more cost-effectively in the litigation.”123 He believed that this 
institutional advantage leads to lower recovery for plaintiffs precisely 
because there are a large number of them.124 He suggests that as an 
alternative, the class action “prevents the defendant from using the 
plaintiffs’ numerosity against them”125 by providing plaintiffs with a 
similar scale economy that defendants enjoy.  
Under this utilitarian justice model, then, the class action is made to 
function as a mechanism for requiring potential individual claimants to act 
collectively in pooling their resources and subordinating their desire to 
maximize their personal interests in order to ensure the optimal outcome 
for the group.126 According to Rosenberg, this model of the class action 
has three basic elements: 
First, to exploit litigation scale economies fully, courts should 
automatically and immediately aggregate all potential and actual 
claims arising from mass tort events into a single mandatory-
litigation class action, allowing no class member to exit. Second, to 
achieve optimal deterrence efficiently, courts should statistically 
estimate total aggregate liability and assess the appropriate level of 
damages (normally, and for present purposes, assumed to equal total 
 
 
 122. See generally David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and 
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (2000) (discussing the impact of the relative economies of 
scale between plaintiffs and defendants). 
 123. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class 
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000). In making this argument, 
Professor Rosenberg departs from his traditional focus on mass exposure cases alone and speaks more 
generally about class actions across areas of substantive law. 
 124. Id. at 1379–80. 
 125. Id. at 1380. 
 126. Rosenberg, supra note 107, at 832. 
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aggregate tortious harm). Third, to advance the goal of optimal 
insurance, courts should distribute damages to class members 
according to the relative severity of their injury rather than the 
relative strength of their legal claim.127 
In support of this model, Rosenberg focused on how the underlying 
philosophy of his class action rule would function in practice under a 
reformulated tort system. He summarized his foundational theory by 
noting: 
[T]he law should seek to minimize the sum of accident costs—
specifically, the total costs of precautions against accident, 
unavoidable harm, risk-bearing, and administration of the legal 
system. . . . I posit systemic failure of administrative regulation to 
control risk appropriately and of government and commercial first-
party insurance to cover loss adequately. Therefore, the need exists 
for “optimal tort deterrence” to prevent unreasonable risk of 
accident and for “optimal tort insurance” to cover residual 
reasonable risk.128 
He argued that the class action fulfills this need. He thus concluded that 
his model’s effectiveness requires that all class actions in mass tort suits 
be mandatory.129  
At the heart of this proposal is Rosenberg’s view that the debate over 
class actions is incorrectly focused on procedure, rather than on its 
substantive tort law dimension.130 Process-oriented analysis, Rosenberg 
believes, distracts from the potential utilitarian virtues of the class action 
procedure in facilitating tort law’s goal of deterring unjustifiably harmful 
behavior.131 He charged the “myopic proceduralist” with placing too much 
stock in the virtues of individualism and procedural formalism, while 
ignoring the functional benefits of what we call his utilitarian justice 
 
 
 127. Id. at 834. 
 128. Id. at 831–32. 
 129. Id. at 831. Professor Rosenberg does qualify this proposal by suggesting that this only applies 
to the adjudication of mass tort cases. See id. (“My prior writings develop the argument for 
adjudicating mass tort cases collectively by mandatory-litigation . . . .”) (emphasis added). This 
limitation, however, neither alters our analysis nor does it remain consistent with the content-neutral 
role of procedure envisioned by the Rules Enabling Act. 
 130. Rosenberg, supra note 103, at 838. 
 131. See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass 
Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 214 (1996) (claiming that his “perspective focuses analysis 
of civil procedure for tort cases on the discrete functions of tort liability in minimizing the costs of 
accident, most importantly by achieving appropriate levels of deterrence and compensation consistent 
with the efficient administration of justice”). 
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model.132 He noted that “proceduralists” compound their analytical 
shortcomings with “shoddy cost-benefit analysis, general disregard of pre-
suit, ex ante conditions, and resort to deontological and even ontological 
claims, usually asserted in the form of vacuous and question-begging 
moralisms, hackneyed slogans, pseudo-traditions, and other conceptual 
shell games like ‘plaintiff autonomy,’ ‘day in court,’ and ‘process 
values.’”133 He further argued that a formalistic approach to individual 
justice causes a net loss to individual plaintiffs and ignores the ex ante 
preferences they would have from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.134 
In contrast to the majority of class action scholars, Rosenberg actually 
does make an effort to ground his class action model in broader precepts 
of political theory. However, he inaccurately portrays his approach as 
effectively all things to all people, satisfying the dictates of virtually every 
normative model of political theory. In reality, Rosenberg’s class action 
approach, when viewed through the lens of political theory, amounts to a 
form of stark, Benthamite utilitarianism, with all of that theory’s disdain 
for the values of individualism contemplated by liberal theory. 
Rosenberg’s tort law view of the class action relies on the basic utilitarian 
principle that the social utility of law is to be determined by reference to 
the extent that it fosters the greatest good to the greatest number. As is true 
of all such utilitarian approaches, this model values individualism only up 
to the point that it is necessary to maximize overall utility.135 Indeed, in 
shaping the utilitarian justice model Rosenberg considers arguments 
focused on individual autonomy to be disingenuous, to the extent they rely 
on “self-validating assertions that individual participation ‘increases self-
respect.’”136 While he does purport to rationalize his model by reference to 
liberal theoretical perspectives as well, such references are wholly 
 
 
 132. “‘Proceduralist’ refers to the approach that ignores deterrence and compensation objectives 
and related individual welfare effects of the substantive law in evaluating the operation and potential 
redesign of the civil liability system.” David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) 
Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 19 n.2. 
 133. Id. Professor Rosenberg has also been highly critical of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 
claiming that they are “basically flawed,” id. at 20, and that they reflect an “inexplicable proceduralist 
disregard of the deterrence and insurance functions of civil liability and general neglect of the relative 
effects of rule choices on individual welfare.” Id. at 20 n.4. Further, “the 1966 revisions also displayed 
neophytic understanding of substantive law governing mass production risks, operational dynamics of 
procedure, and economies of practice.” Id. 
 134. Id. at 25 n.13; Cf. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 136–42. 
 135. As with utilitarians that attempt to quantify the value of individual integrity, Rosenberg 
claims that his model provides for “appropriate regard for individual rights,” rather than any sort of 
absolute protection in the Kantian tradition. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 860.  
 136. Rosenberg, supra note 107, at 211 n.3. 
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specious. For good or ill, his close and dominating tie to utilitarianism is 
clear.137  
The rationale Rosenberg provides for his system makes clear that his 
sole aim in developing the utilitarian justice model is to provide the 
greatest good to society as a whole, regardless of its impact on the 
individual plaintiff’s ability to control the protection of his individually 
held legal rights. His argument in support of this model is divided into two 
parts: a “utilitarian appraisal” and a “rights-based appraisal.”138 Yet both 
are, ultimately, forms of utilitarian analysis, with the “rights-based 
appraisal” simply an extension of his “utilitarian appraisal,” which overtly 
focuses exclusively on considerations of economic efficiency.139 In later 
writing, Rosenberg declared that his model “relies on the normative 
premise that the law should promote individuals’ well being, that is, their 
welfare or utility.”140 While he does use the word “individuals,” that 
hardly qualifies his theory as an example of liberal individualism. In fact, 
but for the largely cosmetic use of the word “individuals,” Rosenberg’s 
approach roughly parallels Bentham’s approach, premised on the postulate 
that “[g]eneral utility ought to be the foundation of [a legislator’s] 
reasonings. To know the true good of the community is what constitutes 
the science of legislation; the art consists in finding the means to realize 
that good.”141 Both Rosenberg and Bentham appear to believe that 
“society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions 
are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction 
summed over all the individuals belonging to it.”142 Rosenberg makes this 
 
 
 137. Rosenberg maintains that from a political theory perspective, his model is consistent with a 
wide range of philosophies, relying on utilitarian theorists, as well as liberals like Rawls and 
libertarians like Nozick. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 859–60; Rosenberg, supra note 103, at 840 & 
n.23. Yet in presenting his argument that liberal theory supports his model, Rosenberg still notes that 
his model is “intuitively more compatible with utilitarian premises than with notions of individual 
rights.” Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 860. 
 138. Rosenberg, supra note 107, at 860. 
 139. Id. In this way, he appears to conflate utilitarianism with law and economics, an approach of 
debatable merit. See Posner, supra note 78 (distinguishing economic analysis of the law from 
Benthamite utilitarianism). 
 140. Rosenberg, supra note 107, at 831. 
 141. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 1 (Upendra Baxi ed., 1975); see also 
GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 681 (3d ed. 1961) (“[Under Bentham’s 
conception of the law] legislation is to be measured in terms of its effectiveness, the costliness of its 
enforcement, and in general by its consequences in producing a system of exchanges which on the 
whole is advantageous to most members of the community. Utility is the only reasonable ground for 
making action obligatory.”). 
 142. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 22 (citing HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (7th ed. 
1907)). It should also be noted, given the link between the model proposed by Professor Rosenberg 
and other law and economics scholars, see supra note 107, that Jeremy Bentham is recognized in some 
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collectivist premise the principal justification for his model.143 He 
effectively adopts a “utility as deterrence” rationale, which sees the 
greatest utility generated by the greatest deterrence. The effect of this 
benefit can only be maximized by use of a mandatory system of class 
actions, where there is no possibility of opting out and plaintiffs do not 
have to assume the cost of notice to absent class members.144  
Rosenberg incorrectly believes that his class action model also grows 
out of a “rights-based appraisal” on the basis of wholly unsupported 
assumptions about the desires and interests of potential plaintiffs. Because 
the claims adjudicated in a class action are, in their pristine substantive 
form, individually held rights on the part of claimants, each of those 
claims individually carries at least the potential for an award of the 
maximum damages allowed by the substantive law. Any model of the 
class action truly grounded in individualism would allow individual 
claimants to choose to take their chances in individual suits to seek those 
maximum damages.  
Rosenberg nevertheless argues that his model goes beyond 
utilitarianism, satisfying elements of both the libertarian analysis of 
Nozick and the liberal theory of Rawls. Yet any claim that his model can 
be reconciled with liberal theory should be met with a high degree of 
skepticism. Rosenberg’s claim that his model is consistent with Nozick’s 
brand of libertarianism fails to adequately account for the total and 
unbending role of individual autonomy laid out by Nozick.145 Rosenberg 
asserts that rights-based theories “are premised on the concept of 
individual entitlements to personal security and autonomy—entitlements 
that may not usually be overridden or compromised for the good of 
society.”146 He then claims that “[t]ortious conduct, whether defined by 
moral, political, or economic criteria, constitutes a wrongful infringement 
of those entitlements.”147 He concludes by arguing that “[f]rom a rights-
oriented standpoint, then, the role of the tort system is to perform 
‘corrective justice’ in order to preserve entitlements against wrongful 
 
 
circles as “the parent of economic analysis of law.” Posting of Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Welfare and 
Economic Analysis, to The Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/animal_welfare/ 
index.html (Apr. 18, 2006, 09:27 CST). 
 143. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 877–87. 
 146. Id. at 877 (citing CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 81–82 (1978); NOZICK, supra note 55, 
at 57). 
 147. Id. 
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infringement.”148 In making this case Rosenberg has two aims. The first is 
to justify his emphasis on deterrence as the primary goal of his class action 
model above compensation. He argues that because there can never be 
total compensation for the invasion of a right,149 achieving optimal 
deterrence is a more important goal of the tort system in achieving the aim 
of “preserv[ing] the value of entitlements.”150 His second aim is to justify 
any perceptible invasion on rights of individuals stemming from the use of 
the class action.  
Despite this explanation, Rosenberg fails to satisfy the concerns of 
libertarian theory. Nozick did suggest that the state was justified in 
providing “protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, 
and so on.”151 Certainly protection from and compensation for the 
negligent acts of others falls within that framework. But Nozick also noted 
that “the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting 
some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for 
their own good or protection.”152 Rosenberg ascribes to Nozick a 
balancing approach to individual rights—namely that the law should 
provide the greatest degree of autonomy and personal security to as large a 
segment of society as reasonably possible. But there is little to suggest 
Nozick would endorse such an approach to individually held rights. In 
their pristine form, both common law and statutory tort rights are 
individually possessed. Even accepting Rosenberg’s functional evaluation 
that one’s rights would be best served by group treatment under a class 
action, he still fails to account for the individual’s autonomy interest in 
determining how to enforce rights that are individually possessed. Thus, 
while Nozick would presumably allow the state to create a system of 
redress for personal wrongs, the suggestion that he would concur in 
anything approaching Rosenberg’s collectivist utilitarian approach to the 
adjudication and enforcement of those rights is questionable. 
More recently, Rosenberg sought to invoke the veil of ignorance 
thought experiment propounded by Rawls, in an effort to rationalize his 
approach as a form of liberal theory.153 Rosenberg argued that an ex ante 
approach to rulemaking demonstrates that his approach to the class action 
is the most just because any individual unaware of the society-to-come 
 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 878–79. 
 150. Id. at 879. 
 151. NOZICK, supra note 55, at ix. 
 152. Id.  
 153. See Rosenberg, supra note 107, at 840–43; discussion supra note 129 and accompanying 
text. 
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would prefer his mandatory approach in light of its optimal deterrence 
effect.154 From this point of view he might claim that he actually does 
respect the role of the individual by valuing individuals up to the point that 
an unbiased individual would do so, phrasing the individual’s choice from 
behind the veil of ignorance as one between reduced compensation and no 
compensation. Based on the risk-averseness Rawls associates with 
decisions made from behind the veil of ignorance, Rosenberg argues that 
“any rational individual would choose a legal system that minimizes the 
sum of accident costs and uses mass tort liability to do so.”155 Once again, 
Rosenberg fails in his effort to be all things to all political theorists. 
Rawls described his theory as “an alternative to utilitarian thought 
generally,” finding utilitarianism deficient for reasons that apply equally to 
Rosenberg’s class action model.156 Utilitarians allow individual interests to 
be overcome if such action corresponds to a sufficient increase in the 
happiness of other societal members. Rawls notes this by saying “[t]he 
striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it does not matter, 
except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among 
individuals.”157 As a result of this analysis, Rawls ultimately concluded 
that “[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons.”158 But clearly, Rosenberg’s approach suffers from the identical 
shortcoming. Rawls might well have objected to the loss of individual 
choice that necessarily comes with Rosenberg’s collectivist approach.159 
Rawls’s First Principle derived from the veil of ignorance thought 
experiment seeks to maximize individual autonomy to the greatest extent 
possible. Rosenberg, in contrast, uses the thought experiment to maximize 
the restriction of individual autonomy based on the broader interest of 
society.  
Rosenberg substantially misuses the Rawlsian veil of ignorance 
construct, primarily because he invokes it at the wrong point in the 
process. When individual class members make the strategic decision 
whether to opt out of a class proceeding (the point at which he employs 
the construct), they are not behind a veil of ignorance, at least in the sense 
 
 
 154. Rosenberg, supra note 107, at 840. It should be noted that under Rule 23 as it exists 
currently, the large majority of mass tort class actions will fall into the (b)(3) category, where both 
notice and an opt-out option are required. Ortiz v. Febreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). This is 
quite different from Rosenberg’s approach. 
 155. Rosenberg, supra note 107, at 840. 
 156. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 22. 
 157. Id. at 26. 
 158. Id. at 27. 
 159. See id. at 61–63. 
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Rosenberg suggests. Of course, individual plaintiffs do not know with 
certainty what the outcome of their individual suits will be. But they do 
know what resources and evidence they will be able to bring to an 
individual suit. Under any system that values process-based individual 
autonomy, the choice whether to sue individually or as part of a collective 
effort is best left to the individual herself. Any externally imposed 
assessment amounts to a form of paternalism that is anathema to core 
notions of liberal individualism. Liberal theory would therefore 
necessarily reject Rosenberg’s model because of its reliance on the 
utilitarian tradition of justifying a heavy sacrifice of individual 
autonomy—in this case, purely process-based autonomy—when the 
societal good is sufficiently powerful.160 
Rosenberg’s contravention of the precepts of liberal theory goes much 
farther than his undermining of process-based individual autonomy. By 
employing what is openly and unambiguously designed to be purely a rule 
of procedure (the class action rule) as a means of surreptitiously altering 
the DNA of preexisting substantive tort law, Rosenberg’s model blatantly 
subverts the foundations of representative democracy on a “macro” level. 
While substantive libertarianism would probably oppose direct 
modification of substantive law in order to collectivize previously 
individually held rights,161 the process-based branch of individual 
autonomy would likely be agnostic on the issue.162 But the fact remains 
that current substantive mass tort law, whether in the form of legislation or 
common law, mostly vests the substantive claim in the victim in an 
individual capacity. If the liberal presumptions about individually held 
rights were, in fact, to be transformed due to compelling and 
overwhelming counterutilitarian interests, such a transformation should be 
achieved by means of an open and transparent exercise of the democratic 
process, rather than furtively under the guise of a rule of procedure.163 
 
 
 160. Cf. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 30–31. Rawls notes that in utilitarian theory,  
if men take a certain pleasure in discriminating against one another, in subjecting others to a 
lesser liberty as a means of enhancing their self-respect, then the satisfaction of these desires 
must be weighed in our deliberations according to their intensity, or whatever, along with 
other desires. If society decides to deny them fulfillment, or to suppress them, it is because 
they tend to be socially destructive and a greater welfare can be achieved in other ways. 
Id.  
 161. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 55–57. It should be noted that constitutional 
and normative barriers to such a transformation would be far greater were it to be imposed 
retroactively, as well as prospectively. 
 162. See discussion supra text preceding note 54. 
 163. See generally Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, 
Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States 
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B. The Communitarian Process Model 
An alternative to the utilitarian justice model is what we label the 
“communitarian process” model of the class action, which, in most cases, 
views a class as a stand alone “entity,” rather than an aggregation of 
separate individual claims. This model, associated principally with the 
scholarship of David Shapiro and Samuel Issacharoff,164 deems the class 
in most cases to be an organic entity, in which each individual class 
member is conceptualized as little more than an inherent element of that 
entity. The individual class members retain little, if any, control over their 
individual claims as the claim itself becomes the property of the class-
entity, which is empowered to make decisions about how to act in the best 
interests of the group as a whole. Though its legal advocates for the most 
part do not frame the model in terms of abstract political theory, to a large 
extent it reflects the normative precepts of democratic 
communitarianism.165  
Perhaps the chief scholarly advocate of an “entity” approach to the 
class action is Shapiro.166 He characterizes the “principal focus” in the 
debate over the correct perspective of the class action as whether a class 
“should be viewed as not involving the claimants as a number of 
individuals . . . but rather as an entity in itself.”167 In determining that “the 
‘class as entity’ forces should ultimately carry the day,”168 he argues that 
the consequence of such an interpretation is that “the individual who is a 
member of the class, for whatever purpose, is and must remain a member 
of that class, and as a result must tie his fortunes to those of the group with 
respect to the litigation, its progress, and its outcome.”169 Shapiro 
 
 
v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2006). 
 164. See Shapiro, supra note 11; Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to 
Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002). 
 165. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 166. Shapiro attributes the notion of a class as an entity to a number of other scholars, and the 
specific “entity” terminology to Professor Edward H. Cooper. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: 
Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26–32 (1996). While the language of a 
class as an entity and many of the ideas associated with that theory do emerge from Professor Cooper’s 
1996 article, Professor Shapiro’s work has helped to provide a more complete portrait of the impact of 
an entity approach to a class. 
 167. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 919. It is notable that Shapiro is careful to point out that the entity theory does not 
eliminate every element of individualism from a class member. Id. (“[E]ven this entity model does not 
deny the class member the opportunity to seek private advice, or to contribute in some way to the 
progress of the litigation . . . .”). Yet he correctly notes that this nominal retention of individual 
autonomy still “severely limits such aspects of individual autonomy as the range of choice to move in 
or out of the class or to be represented before the court by counsel entirely of one’s own selection.” Id.  
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conceptualizes the distinction between an “entity” approach and an 
aggregation-of-individuals approach as one between “advocates of 
individual autonomy in litigation and the proponents of what has been 
praised as ‘collective’ justice.”170 By contrasting his “entity” model with 
one favoring individual autonomy, he acknowledges the subordination of 
individuality inherent in his model. He states that “[t]he conclusion that 
the entity model is preferable is not an easy one for a person like me, who 
believes in the virtues of autonomy and individual choice.”171 While 
acknowledging the tension this creates with individual notions of 
autonomy, particularly if individual choice involves the right to have “a 
personal ‘day in court’—of the ability to participate in the fullest sense in 
the adjudication of a claim of right,” he argues that this virtue is  
far from self-evident: if such participation is not cost-effective, and 
would be seen by the vast majority of those similarly affected (as 
well as by their adversary) to run counter to their own objective of a 
fair and effective outcome, then the argument proceeding from the 
value of autonomy may be flawed.172 
Without squarely arguing that there is a right to a personal day in court, 
Shapiro does seem to suggest that even if that right does exist, other 
factors can override its importance. 
The rationale Shapiro offers for recognizing the inseparable 
intertwining of class members into a coherent, organic unit varies based on 
the nature of the class action. He identifies three general types of class 
actions and proposes differing rationales for an entity approach to each 
type. He claims that the strongest case for entity treatment applies to (b)(1) 
and (b)(2) classes because “the class must in essence stand or fall as a unit 
because of the truly indivisible interests of the class members.”173 He 
therefore argues that they “afford[] less basis for concern about issues of 
individual autonomy and control.”174 This assumption of class 
 
 
 170. Id. at 916. 
 171. Id. at 923. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 925. 
 174. Id. at 926 n.32 (citing Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: 
Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 234–87 (1990)). This 
is a view he attributes to Professor Robert Bone. Bone, supra, at 234. Such a view of the (b)(2) and 
(b)(1) classes, it should be noted, is conceptual nonsense. Both (b)(1) and (b)(2) claims, are, in their 
pristine substantive form, individually held, as proven by the fact that, in the abstract, each could be 
legally pursued to fruition on an individual basis. They are transformed into class form solely because 
of procedural considerations of fairness or efficiency. For a more detailed explication of this point, see 
Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larson, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of 
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indivisibility, however, in most cases has no basis in reality. In (b)(1)(A) 
class actions, for example, the only “indivisible” aspect is the behavior of 
the party opposing the class. In no substantive sense are the rights of the 
class members necessarily indivisible in any sense. Purely as a theoretical 
matter, each could be pursued in its own proceeding, because each is held 
by the litigant in his individual capacity. 
Indivisibility of class member rights is even less evident in (b)(1)(B) 
classes. For example, where individually held tort claims are aggregated 
because of the availability of only a limited insurance fund to pay 
damages, the plaintiff class members’ claims are legally intertwined in no 
substantive sense. To the contrary, in the presence of only a limited fund 
for damages, the strategic antagonism among plaintiff class members is 
even greater than in (b)(3) classes, where the defendant’s resources are 
assumed to be large enough to cover all damages. Finally, in (b)(2) 
classes, where injunctive relief is necessarily the predominant remedy, 
there is not even a requirement that the defendant’s behavior towards class 
members be indivisible, much less that the claims of plaintiff class 
members be indivisible. All that is required is that the party opposing the 
class have acted in a manner generally applicable to the class. It is 
certainly conceivable that such class-wide behavior could be easily 
divisible. For example, an employer could conceivably discriminate 
racially against some employees without doing so to others. Hence 
individualized injunctive relief against the party opposing the class could 
easily be confined only to specified employees. Shapiro’s description is 
accurate, then, only in the circular sense that Rule 23 renders it so. 
The second type of entity-based class Shapiro calls the “small value” 
claim or, in the language used earlier,175 the “Negative Value” class action. 
He argues that the purpose of a small claim or negative value class action 
is not  
compensating those harmed in any significant sense, or of providing 
them a sense of personal vindication, but rather, and perhaps 
entirely, the purpose of allowing a private attorney general to 
contribute to social welfare by bringing an action whose effect is to 
internalize to the wrongdoer the cost of the wrong.176 
The context of the small value class action, Shapiro reasons, makes 
whatever private rights may be sacrificed to the entity a secondary 
 
 
Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (2007). 
 175. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 176. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 924. 
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consideration. From this observation, he argues that “notions of individual 
choice, autonomy, and participation—and their resonance in the 
constitutional guarantee of due process—are not so rigid that they cannot 
yield to practical arguments about the nature of the case, the character of 
the wrong complained of, and the individual interests at stake.”177  
The final category of class actions identified by Shapiro concerns 
positive value class actions under Rule 23(b)(3). He describes these 
classes as “the hardest to bring within” an entity model precisely because 
“the rulemakers in 1966 expressed doubt that such cases were appropriate 
for class treatment at all.”178 He nevertheless finds persuasive support for 
the view “that a mass tort is, and should be treated as, substantively 
different from a one-on-one tort.”179 
Shapiro’s conceptualization of the class as an entity has a number of 
important procedural implications for the operation of the class 
proceeding. For example, he believes acceptance of the entity approach 
leads logically to significant restrictions on the availability of both notice 
and opt-out, even in (b)(3) classes.180 He unquestioningly accepts the 
absence of both in the other categories. 
Shapiro’s description of the entity theory allows for two possible ways 
to conceptualize the entity itself. The first is as an entity that is 
conceptually distinguishable from the aggregation of distinct, 
individualized claims held by each member of the class. Under this theory, 
the aggregation of rights in a class action is metaphysically transformed 
into something distinct from the sum of its parts. The other interpretation 
of the entity is one that conceptualizes the class as a form of aggregation 
of individual claims, but in which the interests of the individual class 
members are pragmatically overwhelmed by the needs of the class as a 
whole. If viewed as the latter, the theory is reminiscent of a form of 
Benthamite utilitarianism.181 If viewed as the former, the entity model is 
more appropriately seen as a type of democratic communitarianism: the 
substantive rights being enforced are determined by democratic processes, 
but once created they are deemed to be held in a communitarian form, 
 
 
 177. Id. at 925. 
 178. Id. at 926. As Shapiro notes, the Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendments to Rule 
23 specifically said that class actions would not be appropriate in mass tort cases because they 
typically would involve different questions of damages, liability, and defenses for each individual 
member. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURTS, 39 F.R.D. 73, 103 (1966) (advisory committee’s notes on proposed Rule 23). 
 179. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 932. 
 180. Id. at 938. 
 181. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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where each individual’s right is defined by and inseparable from the 
whole. 
The very use of the word “entity” to describe the model would seem to 
imply more of a communitarian rationale. However, Shapiro appears to 
employ both theories at various points in his analysis, primarily taking an 
“entity-as-distinct-organism” approach when discussing the so-called 
impersonal (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, where he contends the right is 
effectively a group right because of the nature of the interests being 
litigated.182 In the case of (b)(3) classes, however, Shapiro seems to 
advocate a more starkly pragmatic form of utilitarianism.  
Though he appears to care little about litigant autonomy, Shapiro does 
acknowledge that the most important concern in class litigation is that the 
absent class members are adequately protected by the class representative. 
The fiduciary roles of the class representative and class counsel become 
particularly significant under a model that views the group as an entity that 
subsumes its individual members.183 At some level, at least, Shapiro’s 
class action approach bears similarity to democratic communitarianism 
and its disregard for liberal norms. Whether because of a process of rights 
reconceptualization or a categorical concession of the superiority of group 
needs in class action contexts, Shapiro’s entity model readily transforms 
individually held claims into a communitarian framework. As in classic 
communitarianism, rights of the individual are viewed as inseparable from 
the needs and interests of the community as a whole. In this sense, the 
entity model is reminiscent of Charles Taylor’s critique of classical 
liberalism in justifying a definition of individual rights based on group 
needs.184 The individual class member exists only as a member of the 
larger entity that constitutes the class. By conceptualizing the individual 
class members largely, if not exclusively, as members of a group, the 
communitarian process model’s approach to the individual is the antithesis 
of the liberal “atomism” attacked by Taylor. The rationale that Shapiro 
supplies for this approach focuses primarily on the deterrence objectives of 
class actions.185 
 
 
 182. Given Shapiro’s relatively scant analysis of (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, however, it is difficult 
to determine which of these two approaches he takes in these contexts. Indeed, he may find the 
distinction irrelevant in (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, as, practically speaking, “the class must in essence 
stand or fall as a unit because of the truly indivisible interests of the class members . . . or because the 
granting of equitable relief . . . is bound to affect the group as a whole.” Shapiro, supra note 11, at 925.  
 183. See also Issacharoff, supra note 164, at 1060; Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and 
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 357.  
 184. See supra notes 92–93. 
 185. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 923–24. 
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The value neutrality of democratic communitarianism distinguishes it 
from a device designed from the outset solely to generate predetermined 
policy outcomes.186 In this sense, the approach is distinguishable from the 
“objective truth” version of the theory, which defines the community in 
terms of its commitment to some moral “truth” higher than the normative 
choices reached by democratic processes.187 Thus, Shapiro’s class action 
model involves no commitment to a particular set of predetermined 
substantive value choices. Nevertheless, as a matter of the liberal 
democratic process his model expresses little concern for the autonomy of 
the individual in determining how he will employ the legal system as a 
means of protecting his individually held substantive rights. Instead, 
Shapiro’s concern for the individual is focused for the most part on the 
paternalistic concern that individual plaintiffs will be fairly and adequately 
represented.188 While such a concern is no doubt a legitimate one in those 
situations in which individuals are, for legal or practical reasons, unable to 
make such choices for themselves,189 to deem satisfaction of these 
paternalistic requirements as sufficient, rather than merely necessary, is to 
ignore the foundations of liberal process-based autonomy that are so 
central to the normative structure of liberal democracy. 
Shapiro’s class action model achieves its goal by transforming what in 
every class action category is nothing more than an aggregation of the 
claims of individual plaintiffs possessing individually granted rights into a 
new legal animal—an “entity,” in which an individual’s claim is seen 
essentially as an element within a broader communitarian whole. This fact 
can be proven by answering a very simple hypothetical question: under 
governing substantive law, could each of the plaintiffs who are made 
members of a class bring a legally valid claim individually against the 
defendant, had the class proceeding never been instituted? The answer in 
every situation, of course, must be yes. Rule 23, in all of its categories 
(with the exceptions of Rules 23.1 and 23.2, both of which concern suits 
by substantively established legal entities),190 does nothing more than 
aggregate preexisting individual claims. This distinguishes claims of class 
members from claims brought by true entities, such as partnerships or 
trade unions. 
 
 
 186. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 187. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 90–91. 
 188. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 958–60. 
 189. Indeed, where appropriate such paternalistic concerns are dictated by due process. See 
Hansberry v. Lee, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Redish & Larson, supra note 174. 
 190. See discussion supra Part I. 
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To be sure, unless one is a rigid Kantian, or Nozickian libertarian, it is 
conceivable that, in the presence of compelling circumstances, an 
individual’s ability to control adjudication of his claim may be restricted in 
the interests of a more broadly defined group of claimants. But there are 
two fatal flaws in Shapiro’s articulation of such a model. First, he is far 
too willing to sacrifice the individual to broader communitarian interests, 
never demanding anything approaching a showing of a compelling interest 
for the subjugation of an individual’s process-based autonomy in the 
litigation context. After all, why should one be required to justify 
restriction of individual autonomy, when all that is involved in the first 
place is an entity, where any claim of the individual is fully shared with 
others? Second, he seems quite content to allow this alchemy-like 
transformation of individual right to entity-held right through reliance on a 
procedural rule that, by statutory origin, is not permitted to modify or 
abridge substantive rights. If individually held substantive claims are 
either to be transformed into entity claims, or sacrificed to broader 
communitarian interests, surely it is only by transparent resort to the 
representative and accountable branches of government that such results 
are appropriately achievable. Through reliance on the smokescreen of 
procedural joinder and fictionalized entities, however, Shapiro is somehow 
able to avoid both an analysis of the need for the compelling interest 
standard and the need for acquiring support in the democratic process. 
C. The Public Action Model 
The “public action” model of the class action views the private class 
action exclusively as an instrument to enforce public goals and values, as 
embodied in governing law. In this sense, the model differs fundamentally 
from both the liberal and communitarian models.191 The public action 
model evaluates the proper role of the class action on the basis of a 
normative judgment of what is “good” for society in two ways. Public 
action model adherents claim that while individual litigant participation in 
a lawsuit is important in certain types of litigation, the class action is 
justified solely because it aids in the enforcement of laws that implement 
broader public purposes.192 The public action model sees the class action 
 
 
 191. See discussion supra Part III.B; discussion infra Part IV. 
 192. OWEN FISS, The Allure of Individualism, in THE LAW AS IT COULD BE, supra note 2, at 118; 
see also id. at 122 (“It is not surprising, therefore, that the class action gained great currency during the 
civil rights era, when private attorneys generally received their greatest endorsement through the 
actions of groups such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.”). 
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as a means of protecting the public interest, rather than vindicating 
aggregated private interests.193 
The public action model’s strongest advocate is Owen Fiss. Fiss asserts 
that the class action device exists because certain laws are aimed at 
protecting the public, and private suits brought to enforce those laws will 
have the beneficial effect of vindicating the public interest.194 He reasons 
that class certification increases the value of claims that, standing alone, 
would have been economically inefficient to pursue, even though socially 
significant. The goal, then, is to make them viable causes of action that 
provide sufficient economic incentive for attorneys to pursue them.195 The 
public’s interest in seeing these cases litigated justifies any restriction that 
class action procedure may impose on an individual’s process-based 
autonomy. Fiss advocates a limitation on the use of the class action on the 
basis of this underlying philosophy, arguing that “[a] court should not 
permit a plaintiff to bring suit on behalf of unnamed class members unless 
the class lawsuit is necessary to vindicate important public rights and the 
named plaintiff satisfies the court that he will adequately represent the 
interests of the other class members.”196 Fiss never states precisely what 
makes the subject of a class action “an important public right,” limiting his 
description to those statutes “aimed at protecting the public.”197 He does 
suggest, however, that some normative judgment about the “importance” 
of a suit should color the drafting, and possibly the application, of the class 
action rule.198  
Fiss makes clear that the class action supersedes an individual’s interest 
in having his own day in court because the device is designed to advance 
the public good.199 He distinguishes the types of litigation in which the 
 
 
 193. John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1419, 
1423 (2003). 
 194. Id.  
 195. FISS, supra note 2, at 125 (“[T]he level of compensation must be high enough to make it 
worthwhile for the best and brightest to undertake such ventures.”). 
 196. Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 193, at 1423. 
 197. Id. at 1419. 
 198. Id. Fiss also fails to make clear whether a private lawsuit that provided no public benefit or 
operated against the public interest could be legitimately certified as a class if it still met the formal 
Rule 23 requirements, although he does seem to suggest that the Rule 23(b)(3) “superiority” factor 
could be used to preclude class actions where no public goals were achieved through a specific class 
action. See id. at 1424 (discussing the use of “superiority” as a means of limiting the instances where 
classes are certified). 
 199. As a general matter, Fiss believes the job of courts is “not to maximize the ends of private 
parties nor simply to secure the peace but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in 
authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: Their job is to interpret those values and bring 
reality into accord with them.” OWEN FISS, Against Settlement, in THE LAW AS IT COULD BE, supra 
note 2, at 101. 
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individual’s right to participate is to be respected by claiming that “the 
fairness of procedures turns, in part, on the social ends they serve.”200 The 
distinction rests on the difference between what Fiss calls “interest 
representation,” which he associates with class actions, and representation 
that he describes as “consistent with individualistic values.”201 Interest 
representation occurs where an “individual [is] bound by the action of 
someone purporting to be his or her representative even though that 
individual had no say whatsoever over the selection of that representative, 
indeed, might not have even known of the appointment or that he or she 
was being represented.”202 He believes that while “the value of individual 
participation has an important role to play in the legal process . . . we must 
also recognize that we accord that value different weight in different 
contexts.”203 Fiss concedes that a system in which “[t]he named plaintiff is 
not the agent of the other class members” is “inherently suspect and 
grate[s] against even a minimum regard for allowing individuals to be in 
charge of their own destiny.”204 Yet he justifies the “interest 
representation” for class actions solely because such proceedings, under 
the circumstances in which he envisions their use, “enhance private 
enforcement of public laws.”205  
Fiss determines under what circumstances the value of individual 
participation is to be deemed sufficiently strong to preclude interest 
representation based on a normative determination of whether society is 
best served by abridging an individual’s process-based autonomy. He uses 
the examples of criminal cases and adjudicatory administrative 
proceedings as instances in which individualized participation “is a value 
in its own right,” because “particular individuals have been singled 
out.”206 In these instances, he finds that individual participation “manifests 
a public commitment to the dignity and worth of the individual, [and] 
serv[es] a more instrumental end by ensuring that the facts and issues are 
presented to the court in the sharpest possible terms.”207 Fiss argues that 
class actions do justify restriction of an individual’s right to participate in 
litigation, however, “for the private enforcement of laws that are aimed at 
 
 
 200. See FISS, supra note 192, at 121. 
 201. Id. at 116. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 119–120. 
 204. Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 193, at 1421. 
 205. FISS, supra note 192, at 118. 
 206. Id. at 120. In drawing this distinction, Fiss is differentiating these types of litigation from 
structural injunctions that appear in civil rights litigation.  
 207. Id. 
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protecting the public.”208 This suggests that the public purposes he 
attributes to these laws do not single out individuals in a manner that 
signifies a public commitment to their dignity and worth. He criticizes the 
sort of individualism that is “Kantian in nature and gives each individual 
total control over his or her rights.”209 His contextual view of rights, based 
on his own assessment of societal consequences, allows him to draw a line 
between litigation in which process-based autonomy should be protected 
and litigation in which it should not, based on his assessment of the suit’s 
social importance.210 
From the perspective of liberal individualism, Fiss manages to combine 
the worst of both worlds. In cases deemed to have been brought in 
furtherance of the public interest, the individual’s autonomy interest in 
control over his claim means preciously little. The autonomy interest is to 
be summarily sacrificed to the needs of a broader collectivist process.211 
This is so, even though the triggers for the lawsuits—the vehicle by which 
the public interest is to be legally enforced—are legal claims vested by 
lawgiving authority solely in the individual claimants themselves. Their 
pursuit may well advance the public interest, but that does not alter the 
fact that two legal rights being enforced are privately held. However, when 
the claims being enforced are deemed to have been brought predominantly 
in furtherance of private interests, the strategic and efficiency benefits of 
class treatment are apparently to be largely denied to them, even in cases 
in which the interests of individual claimants could possibly be furthered 
by use of class action treatment. 
Though Fiss does not expressly employ the characterization and the fit 
is by no means perfect, we believe that the public action model is strongly 
reminiscent of a form of modern civic republicanism. That political 
theory, it should be recalled, focuses on pursuit of some vague notion of 
the public interest that differs qualitatively from the aggregation of 
individual interests.212 The theory expresses disdain for individualism, in 
most contexts, as the morally unacceptable pursuit of selfish personal 
interests at the expense of the public at large.213 If one sees the 
individualism central to liberal theory as necessary for the flourishing of 
 
 
 208. Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 193, at 1419. 
 209. FISS, supra note 192, at 120; see also Judith Resnick, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 52 (1991) (“The primacy of the individual in relation to her or his own case 
has declined.”). 
 210. See FISS, supra note 192, at 120. 
 211. See Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 193, at 1419, 1424. 
 212. See Redish & Lippman, supra note 106; discussion supra Part II.C. 
 213. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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the citizenry and the ultimate success of democracy, as we do,214 then 
modern civic republicanism must be deemed a serious threat to the moral 
and personal pluralism so vital to an active and ever developing 
democracy. To the extent the public action model of the class action 
reflects a normative commitment to some notion of the public interest 
divorced from and in lieu of the vindication of individual rights—which it 
appears to do—then, like civic republican political theory, it must be 
rejected. 
It surely does not follow, we should emphasize, that the class action is 
to play no role in facilitating enforcement of public-regarding law. As Fiss 
correctly notes, the class action has often been rationalized as a form of 
“private attorney general.” The earliest explanation of the private attorney 
general rationale for the class action dates back to the seminal article by 
Professors Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield. Kalven and Rosenfield 
envisioned the class action as a device for filling gaps in the enforcement 
of statutes. They argued that the need to effectuate the “deterrent effect of 
the sanctions which underlie much contemporary law” had been largely 
addressed by “the contemporary development of administrative law,” but 
that this method of enforcement had alone proven insufficient.215 Further, 
they argued that use of traditional joinder devices fails to provide an 
adequate group remedy because “it presupposes the prospective plaintiffs’ 
advancing en masse on the courts.”216 Only class actions, a system in 
which courts “ignore the various claimants until a decree has been 
obtained,”217 would serve as the needed “vehicle for paying lawyers 
handsomely to be champions of semi-public rights.”218  
The reporter for the rules advisory committee that promulgated the 
pivotal 1966 amendments to Rule 23 also considered the class action to be 
consistent with the private attorney general concept. Professor Benjamin 
Kaplan, while not expressly using the term “private attorney general,” 
clearly recognized the use of class suits as a means of advancing the public 
interest.219 But there was certainly nothing in the revised rule that confined 
the benefits of the class action to such “public interest” situations. The 
 
 
 214. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 215. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 684, 686–87 (1941) (“[Administrative law] is a method of preventing injuries by the 
injunction, the stop order and the cease and desist order . . . . [A]n administrative body does not 
normally act to remedy wrongs which have occurred.”).  
 216. Id. at 687. 
 217. Id. at 688. 
 218. Id. at 717. 
 219. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 394. 
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1966 amendments to Rule 23 sought to create a standard that would “sort 
out the factual situations or patterns that had recurred in class actions and 
appeared with varying degrees of convincingness to justify treatment of 
the class in solido.”220 The focus of these amendments was on the legal 
and factual situation at hand, not exclusively on the pursuit of a broader 
societal interest. 
The variation on the private attorney general approach that Fiss 
employs to rationalize the class action led him to suggest a series of 
changes to Rule 23, designed to better reflect what he believed to be the 
procedural device’s philosophical foundation. He argued that class actions 
are justified only where they serve to provide for private enforcement of 
“public laws,” and that the current incarnation of Rule 23 should be 
“revise[d] . . . to make certain that it is used only in those situations where 
that social purpose is served.”221 The key alteration he proposed would be 
elimination of the class action categories set out in Rule 23(b), making 
every class action subject to an analysis using both the current 23(a) 
factors and the two factors listed in 23(b)(3).222 Fiss also proposed 
reinterpretation of some of the factors he would preserve from Rule 23(a) 
and 23(b)(3). In addition to his suggested approach to the (b)(3) 
requirement of superiority,223 he argued that the “numerosity” requirement 
of Rule 23(a) should be read to make sure that class actions are only 
allowed where “there are many small individual claims” that in the 
aggregate “constitute a [sufficient] social harm,” seemingly implying that 
the class action should be confined solely to negative value claims.224 Fiss 
claims that the considerations that go into creating separate types of class 
actions under 23(b) “do not serve the purpose of directing a court to 
scrutinize either the adequacy of interest representation or the social value 
and practical necessity of bringing a lawsuit as a class action.”225 He then 
 
 
 220. Id. at 386. See also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 342 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 221. Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 193, at 1422. Interestingly, Professors Fiss and Bronsteen 
appear to propose changes to the rule in the same breath that they question the obligations of courts to 
observe the niceties of any procedural rule. Compare id. at 1423–50, with id. at 1451 (“Rule 23 lacks 
the force of law as that term is ordinarily understood. The rule is but a guideline or rule of thumb 
whose force derives only from consistent practice and the wisdom that the rule embodies.”).  
 222. Notably, Kalven and Rosenfield made a similar argument with respect to the elimination of 
the older distinctions between “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” class actions. See Kalven & Rosenfield, 
supra note 215, at 703.  
 223. See supra Part II.C. 
 224. Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 193, at 1419, 1423. They go on to claim that the numerosity 
requirement should be used to help “limit class actions to circumstances in which they are necessary to 
uphold a value that is important enough to absent class members inherent in any class action.” Id. at 
1423. 
 225. Id. at 1427. 
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called for a uniform standard for individualized notice, with an eye toward 
minimizing costs to the plaintiffs.226  
Because Fiss’s model, much like the theory of civic republicanism, 
focuses exclusively on protection of the public interest, rather than on the 
need to vindicate individuals’ private interests, he seems to dismiss the 
possibility that, under certain circumstances, use of the class action device 
could effectively facilitate the vindication of private rights. We see no 
reason, however, why the public and private uses of the class action need 
be considered mutually exclusive. Contrary to Fiss’s suggestion, the class 
action may produce strategic benefit even to positive value claim holders, 
whatever its impact on enforcement of public-regarding laws. 
Where Fiss’s model runs into potential difficulty, above and beyond its 
unnecessary truncation of public law enforcement, is its conceivable use to 
rationalize “faux” class actions. These are suits that purport to be negative 
value class suits, but in which the individual claims are so small that no 
reasonable class member could be expected to expend the time and effort 
to claim his minimal portion of the ultimate award. Presumably Fiss would 
have no problem with such a use of the class action, since it is designed 
solely to further the public interest by enforcing public values and policing 
governmental and corporate misbehavior. This analysis, however, 
dangerously ignores significant alteration of the remedial portion of the 
underlying substantive law. That law has vested a compensatory remedy in 
the individual claimant, not in bounty hunter private plaintiffs’ 
attorneys—the only individuals who benefit directly from a faux class 
action. Such a fundamental transformation in underlying law requires 
transparent modification through democratic processes.227 
IV. FASHIONING AN “INDIVIDUALIST” MODEL OF THE CLASS ACTION 
Thus far, we have established that existing scholarly models of the 
class action emanate—at least implicitly—from traditions of political 
theory that either minimize or disregard the significance of process-based 
individual autonomy. Indeed, one might be tempted to assume that, 
because of its essentially collectivist nature, the class action is inherently 
inconsistent with foundational notions of liberal individualism, and that to 
accept the procedure is necessarily to undermine or limit individualism. 
There are, to be sure, potential tensions between the class action procedure 
and the political theory of process-based individualism. In situations 
 
 
 226. See id. at 1434–39. 
 227. See generally Redish, supra note 10. 
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where this tension is inescapable, we believe that the normative force of 
process-based individualism requires that the class action procedure be 
supported by a showing of a truly compelling justification. It is important 
to understand, however, that the two should not always be seen to be in 
conflict. To the contrary, numerous instances will arise where authorizing 
a class action will actually serve as a catalyst to the attainment of 
individualist goals and the furtherance of individualist values. In this 
section, we seek to fashion a normative model of the class action that 
achieves these salutary ends.228 In so doing we seek to overcome the 
shortcomings of the three existing models we previously identified by 
better reflecting the liberal individualist norms that, we believe, inhere in 
our civil justice system and its foundational commitment to the adversary 
process.229  
A. The “Individualist Difference” Principle 
The initial problem in designing a class action framework consistent 
with liberal theory is the prima facie individualist-collectivist tension that 
exists between an individual’s interest in process-based autonomy 
(dictating unfettered individual discretion in controlling litigation) on the 
one hand and the scope of authority vested in class representatives in a 
class action that effectively supersedes the individual class members’ 
ability to control adjudication of their own claims on the other. The class 
action limits an individual’s ability to direct the course of his interaction 
with the judicial process because class representatives effectively make all 
the decisions about how the individually possessed claims will be pursued. 
In mandatory classes, the infringement on an individual’s process-based 
autonomy interest is even greater because the individual lacks even the 
basic choice whether to participate in the collective and passive litigation 
of his rights. 
In crafting a model of the class action that focuses on the fundamental 
importance of an individual’s process-based autonomy, we draw a loose 
methodological analogy to the two principles of justice identified by John 
Rawls in his A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s “First Principle,” it should be 
recalled, requires that all people enjoy the greatest degree of liberty 
 
 
 228. This does not, we should note, represent a legal construction of the specific provisions of the 
current Rule 23. Rather, it is a normative approach to how the class action should be utilized, grounded 
in ideas drawn from political theory. 
 229. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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compatible with like liberty for all.230 In a parallel manner, our class action 
model begins with the premise that, at least as a prima facie matter, all 
individuals are entitled to full control over the process-based choices made 
while pursuing their individual claims,231 and that—again, at least as a 
prima facie matter—control of those choices may not be taken away 
without the individual’s unambiguous expression of consent. Rawls’s 
“Second Principle,” which he labels “the Difference Principle,” requires 
that social and economic inequalities be attached to positions open to all 
under fair equality of opportunity, and that these inequalities be arranged 
to the greatest benefit to the least well off members of society.232 The 
foundation for this perspective is Rawls’s belief that it would be unjust to 
have “inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.”233 The Difference 
Principle, therefore, asserts that the unequal distribution of social and 
economic power is justified if, and only if, that inequality acts to benefit 
society’s least well off.  
The justification for our Individualist Model of the class action relies 
on a loose analogy to Rawls’s Difference Principle. We therefore label it 
an “Individualist Difference Principle.” Just as Rawls’s Difference 
Principle justifies inequality based on the paradoxical potential for those 
inequalities to benefit the least well off members of society, the 
Individualist Difference Principle justifies the limitations that class 
certification places on an individual’s process-based autonomy rights if, 
and only if, treating him as part of a collective litigating unit would 
ultimately advance his individual interests in a manner he is incapable of 
achieving as an individual litigant. While our First Principle posits that 
individuals be able to protect their legally recognized interests 
independently by resort to the litigation system, the Individualist 
Difference Principle recognizes the occasional value of collectivism in 
promoting the exercise of an individual’s litigating autonomy. The use of 
the collectivist class action procedural device is thus justified in those 
instances where, absent such a process, the individual claimants will be 
effectively unable to vindicate their individual claims if they are required 
to pursue them on their own.234 The Individualist Model conceptualizes 
 
 
 230. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 60–61. 
 231. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 232. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 62. 
 233. Id. 
 234. We recognize, of course, that our analogy to Rawls breaks down when viewed on a purely 
normative level. While we establish our two principles on the basis of an unwavering normative 
commitment to the value of process-based individualism, Rawls’s Second Principle quite clearly 
contemplates a significant modification of the seemingly unbending commitment to individual liberty 
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the class action as a tool for aiding the individual’s pursuit of his own 
interests and as a means of furthering process-based autonomy by 
providing individuals with the option of an alternative collectivist strategy 
for maximizing their claims through a process of voluntary collectivism.  
While our class action model selectively authorizes procedural 
collectivization, it is designed to remain consistent with core values of 
process-based autonomy. Even when it authorizes collectivization, it 
views litigants as autonomous beings brought together as an aggregate of 
individuals, rather than as a stand alone entity. In this sense, the 
substantive rights sought to be vindicated remain individually held and are 
simply brought in one proceeding, with the nuances between individual 
claims recognized through the use of subclasses and separate damage 
hearings, where necessary. In so doing, the model is careful not to 
transform the underlying substantive law being enforced in the class 
proceeding. 
B. The Mechanics of the Individualist Class Action 
Crafting a model of the class action that flows from the normative 
value that liberal theory places on individualism requires that any rule 
providing for the creation of class actions have as its primary focus the 
preservation and facilitation of process-based individual autonomy. In this 
sense, the class action is appropriately seen as a procedural analogy to the 
substantive freedom of association that has been recognized under the 
First Amendment right of free expression.235 In both contexts, individuals 
may choose to collectivize in order to more effectively exercise their 
process-based autonomy. Such a view of the class action is fully consistent 
with the dictates of the substance-procedure dichotomy embodied in the 
Rules Enabling Act, pursuant to which the class action rule is 
promulgated,236 because it recognizes that the applicable substantive law 
has, in most cases, created exclusively individually held, rather than group 
held, claims. In shaping our model, we seek to demonstrate that a class 
action rule derived from liberal theory provides a powerful alternative to 
 
 
embodied in his First Principle. Still, we do not consider our model to be diametrically and inherently 
opposed to Rawls’s second principle, because our focus is exclusively on the value of process-based 
autonomy, while Rawls’s modification exclusively concerns the substantive version—an issue on 
which we are agnostic. More importantly, our analogy is purely a structural one. Like Rawls, we 
develop two principles, the second of which restricts the first when to do so would paradoxically 
further the liberty of all individual claimants. 
 235. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 236. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
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existing class action models premised upon utilitarian, communitarian, or 
civic republican theory. The primacy afforded the role of individuals and 
the exercise of their process-based autonomy under liberal theory would 
appropriately establish a class action rule that maintains the American 
adversary tradition in which, in most cases, litigants are allowed to 
voluntarily choose to make use of the judicial process in order to protect or 
vindicate their individually held rights. 
1. Mandatory Classes 
Perhaps the easiest conclusion for one committed to liberal 
individualism is that mandatory class actions will almost always be 
deemed invalid because of their negative impact on process-based 
autonomy. The notion that a class representative could require another 
individual to resort to the judicial process for redress of a wrong inflicted 
against the two of them, and limit or remove that individual’s ability to 
control the litigation, serves as an egregious example of an unwarranted 
restriction of process-based autonomy. Liberal theory contemplates that 
individuals will possess the opportunity to exercise their autonomy in 
choosing either to exercise or refuse to exercise the right to initiate 
litigation, and to control it once instituted.237 
That is not to say, however, that all mandatory classes are necessarily 
unjustifiable under most forms of liberal theory. Where the rigid 
protection of individual autonomy is simply not feasible or would lead to 
absurd results, any form of liberal theory other than, presumably, a pure 
Kantian version would recognize the need for individualist values to give 
way. Such circumstances would amount to the showing of a truly 
compelling justification for abandonment of liberal individualism. This 
appears to be so in the case of the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class, where individual 
suits could give rise to conflicting obligations for a litigant opposing the 
class. But while Professor Shapiro justifies the mandatory nature of these 
classes on the basis of the interrelationship of the interests of the 
 
 
 237. We should emphasize that to say that an individual has the right to refuse to initiate litigation 
does not necessarily mean that the individual will always possess unfettered autonomy in choosing the 
timing of suit. Thus, we see no problems with compulsory counterclaims, see FED. R. CIV. P. 131(a), or 
declaratory judgment proceedings, in which a potential defendant can effectively require a potential 
plaintiff to litigate his claim. The key difference is that in both of these contexts, the potential plaintiff 
always has the option of having res judicata imposed against him due to his refusal to pursue his claim. 
In contrast, a member of a mandatory class has no option to withdraw pursuit of his claim under any 
circumstances. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 753 Redish Berlow book pages.doc 3/11/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
808 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:753 
 
 
 
 
litigants,238 such a view—for reasons already explained—is clearly 
incorrect.239 The point, rather, is the compelling need to avoid anomalous 
results that would flow from permitting separate actions. The coercive 
power of the State cannot justly be used to force a party into a no-win 
situation. Imposing anomalous obligations on individual defendants forces 
them to exercise their autonomy so that they must ignore one of the 
obligations placed upon them. The severe restriction on the defendant’s 
autonomy would seem to justify restriction of the autonomy of the various 
potential plaintiffs in this context.  
Currently, Rule 23 also makes the so-called “limited fund” classes 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory. When considered from the vantage 
point of liberal theory, this conclusion is difficult to justify. In the case of 
limited fund class actions, the rationale for treating them as mandatory 
classes is that doing so provides for a more egalitarian distribution of 
compensation in cases where it would be impossible for every member of 
the class to collect their complete damages if every suit were brought as an 
individual action.240 While this is a plausible argument, it does not go so 
far as to eliminate an individual’s interest in process-based autonomy. The 
decision to opt in or opt out of a class represents an individual’s decision 
as to how he can best advance his interests. If a litigant concludes that his 
interests would be better advanced by not participating in the class and 
either proceeding on his own with the representation of his choosing or not 
proceeding at all—perhaps for ideological reasons—there is no reason to 
prevent them from exercising that choice. Unlike in a (b)(1)(A) class, the 
act of opting out of a (b)(1)(B) class would not create a scenario where the 
protection of process-based autonomy would give rise to anomalous or 
logically untenable results. Rather, it would merely reflect the high value 
placed on process-based autonomy by the adversary system and the liberal 
theory of which it is an outgrowth.  
Currently, Rule 23 also makes classes primarily seeking injunctive or 
declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) mandatory.241 The argument for 
treating them as mandatory classes is that the relief will benefit the entire 
class as a whole, making the act of opting out largely meaningless. 
Further, should individuals choose not to participate in a class action, the 
 
 
 238. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 925–26. 
 239. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 240. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 228–31 (2003). 
 241. A litigant may seek damages in addition to an injunction or declaratory judgment, but that 
relief must be the secondary form of relief being sought. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1775, at 463–70 (2d ed. 1986). 
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fear is that they could subject a defendant to the cost of litigating the same 
suit for injunctive or declaratory relief over and over again. 
Yet in the special case of the (b)(2) class, recall that the plaintiffs are 
often civil rights plaintiffs seeking what has been described as “idealistic” 
ends.242 It is certainly conceivable that some individuals may not agree 
with the idealistic ends being sought and it would be improper to presume 
their assent to that end. From the perspective of liberal theory, then, 
individuals should be able to register their dissent from the ideological 
ends being pursued. Thus, an individual should be able to register that 
dissent through self-removal from the class. While it is reasonable to 
operate from a presumption that the individual interests of the class 
members will be consistent with one another, this alone does not justify 
the mandatory nature of the (b)(2) class. Class members in a (b)(2) class 
may disagree with the entire notion of the suit or conclude that their 
interests are better served by exiting the class. Under liberal theory, they 
retain this option. These considerations lead to the conclusion that (b)(2) 
classes should allow for self-exclusion from the class.  
It should be recalled that Professor Rosenberg’s class action model 
would dictate the use of mandatory class proceedings in mass tort 
exposure cases.243 While Rosenberg provides interesting and thoughtful 
rationales for such mandatory treatment, we cannot deem his justifications 
to be sufficiently compelling to validate abandonment of a litigant’s right 
to pursue his claim individually. In such cases the individual stakes are 
likely to be quite high. At the very least, if such a drastic modification of 
our adjudicatory system is to be implemented, it must be through resort to 
the governing processes by which the substantive rights are created in the 
first place. If the authoritative organs of government—whether legislative 
or judicial—wish to transform the DNA of the substantive rights involved 
by reconceptualizing them substantively as group held rights, the political 
process may police such choices. To continue to conceptualize the 
substantive rights as individually held while simultaneously transforming 
them under the guise of procedural modification is to divert—and 
probably pervert—the democratic process. In this sense, the “micro” 
version of liberal democratic theory, focused on preservation of the right 
of the individual litigant to enforce his substantive rights, serves also to 
 
 
 242. See Redish, supra note 10, at 93–94. 
 243. See discussion supra Part III.A. Note that this is generally not current practice under Rule 23, 
since most mass exposure cases are likely to fall within the (b)(3) category, where the opt-out right is 
guaranteed. 
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protect the “macro” version of the theory by preserving basic notions of 
transparency and accountability. 
2. Class Actions, Opt-Out, and the Sliding Scale 
As we have shown, liberal theory authorizes mandatory class actions 
only in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances. To the extent 
class participation is purely voluntary, however, one might reason that no 
tension exists between the collectivist class action proceeding and 
individualism: individuals may choose to associate with others in pursuing 
enforcement of their rights. Viewed in this manner, the class proceeding 
might be seen as simply another voluntary joinder device, or an analogy to 
the First Amendment freedom of association. But while such reasoning is 
correct purely as a matter of theoretical abstraction, the issue tends to 
become more complicated when placed in the context of litigation reality. 
There are two conceivable means by which a litigant may exercise her 
choice not to participate in a class action: (1) failing to include herself in 
the class (opt-in) or (2) failing to remove herself from the class (opt-out). 
Because the inertia is so very different in the two situations, the practical 
and theoretical consequences may differ dramatically, depending on which 
method is chosen. Many who fail to remove themselves from the class 
may well do so either because of misunderstanding, confusion, or simple 
forgetfulness. Thus, a failure to opt out may not always reflect a class 
member’s considered decision to pursue his claims through the class 
proceeding. 
In shaping our individualist model, we seek to establish a sliding scale 
for determining when, if ever, the more passive opt-out procedure, rather 
than an affirmative opt-in procedure, should be permitted. As the size of 
the individual claim increases, the likelihood that an individual will 
consent to the surrender of his process-based autonomy rights probably 
decreases. As such, the individualist model of the class action ties the 
decision between an opt-in or an opt-out system based on the value of the 
individually possessed claims. It requires class members to opt in where 
the class action involves a positive value claim and permits use of an opt-
out procedure in cases involving negative value claims, under certain 
circumstances. This reflects the reasonable ex ante presumption that 
individuals are more likely to choose to participate in the class when their 
claims are so small that individual suit would not be viable. But because 
under an opt-out system this presumption is rebuttable, our approach 
preserves the ability of every individual to make the decision to choose not 
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to participate in the judicial process or take his chances by leaving the 
group and going it alone. 
In drawing this distinction, we draw upon Professor Coffee’s labels to 
distinguish positive value claims from negative value claims.244 Yet while 
we accept Coffee’s distinction between positive value “Type-A” class 
actions and negative value “Type-B” class actions, we replace Coffee’s 
“Type-C” category (a mixture of “Type-A” and “Type-B” claims) with our 
own version of the “Type-C” class action. There are, we believe, two 
distinct types of negative value claims. On the one hand, some negative 
value claims are of sufficient size that a rational person would want to go 
to the trouble of taking affirmative steps to redeem a favorable award, 
even though individualized pursuit of the claim by resort to the litigation 
process would presumably not be viable. The appropriate rationale for use 
of an opt-out procedure, as currently employed in (b)(3) class actions, is 
the presumption that an absent class member would generally have no 
reason not to participate in the class proceeding. In those particular 
situations in which the individual class member does wish to do so, 
affirmative action on his part should be required to reverse that 
presumption.  
On the other hand, some negative value claims are so low that a 
rational person would be unlikely even to go to the trouble to put in for the 
claim once a class-based award has been made or settlement reached, 
much less pursue individualized litigation. As previously noted, this sort 
of class action is appropriately described as the “faux class action,”245 
because absent class members are litigants in name only. Type-C classes 
should never be authorized, because they do not represent a true 
aggregation of individual claims required and assumed by Rule 23 and the 
underlying substantive law. Instead, they are effectively nothing more than 
“bounty hunter” suits, in which the plaintiffs’ attorneys, rather than the 
class members, are the real parties in interest. These suits are illegitimate, 
not because they are inherently immoral, but because they are 
unauthorized by the substantive law being enforced in the class 
proceeding. As nothing more than a procedural rule, Rule 23 may not 
transform the underlying substantive law that provides the basis for the 
suit in the first place.246 The prohibition on Type-C classes under an opt-in 
rule does not follow as a result of normative liberal theory’s concern for 
individualism, but from the procedural concerns of macro democratic 
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theory.247 The substantive statutes that provide private damage remedies 
typically provide remedies vested in the individual as victim. A class 
action is, in every legal sense, merely the aggregation of those individual 
claims. When claims are so miniscule that individuals are unlikely to take 
the effort to recover their awarded claims, then the lawsuit effectively 
becomes a qui tam action—inducing the plaintiffs’ attorneys to act as 
private enforcers of legal restraints—that is not created by the substantive 
law itself.248 This allows a rule of procedure to amend the statutes enacted 
by the legislative process, running counter to the most foundational 
principles of democratic government. 
As this trichotomy of plaintiffs’ claims underscores, however, 
predictions about plaintiffs’ strategic choices are not always as easy to 
make as this reasoning suggests. Plaintiffs with Type-A claims are, it 
would seem, just as likely to choose to pursue their claims on their own as 
to effectively forfeit all control to class representatives. The entire basis 
for the reasonable presumption of inclusion, then, breaks down in Type-A 
classes. What remains in its wake is liberal theory’s presumption of an 
individual’s process-based autonomy. Thus, for Type-A claims, where the 
economic stakes to the individual plaintiff are substantial, an opt-in 
procedure should be required. There is nothing to prevent an individual 
litigant from agreeing to become a member of the class based on his 
assessment that his interests would be best advanced by collective 
litigation. But the opt-out presumption does not reflect the value placed on 
individual autonomy in liberal theory and creates a higher burden for those 
who wish not to sue than on those who want to sue. In short, opting out 
has the effect of putting words into a litigant’s mouth—a practice that 
contradicts fundamental precepts of liberal theory, absent some strong ex 
ante basis to assume the contrary.  
The presumption that individuals wish to retain their process-based 
autonomy is far less persuasive in the context of the Type-B class. For 
negative value claims, the ability of a litigant to control his claim is largely 
illusory, because by hypothesis his claim is not practically sustainable as a 
separate, individual suit, even though the formal possibility of pursuing 
the claim through individualized resort to the litigation process remains. 
The presumption in favor of consent to sue in this context leads logically 
to authorization of an opt-out system. Here, for an individual to vindicate 
his claim, he has few, if any, options beyond consenting to be a part of a 
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class. Should individuals in this position wish to take their chances and 
attempt to seek a better means of protecting their own interests, then they 
retain the autonomous decision making power to do so. This conclusion 
follows directly from our Individualist Difference Principle: opt-out and 
opt-in are varied, based on which of the two procedures is more likely to 
further the individual claimant’s interests in vindicating his rights. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to make explicit what to date has been largely 
implicit: the ramifications for political theory of existing class action 
models. Further, it has offered a class action model rooted in the 
individualist concerns that lie at the heart of liberal theory. Once this 
theoretical centrality is accepted, the class action models of leading legal 
scholars are revealed for what they basically are: rejections of liberal 
process-based individualism. 
The class action model advocated in this Article attempts to reconcile 
the role of process-based autonomy with the inherent collectivism of the 
class action device. Our system’s traditional commitment to process-based 
individual autonomy presents inescapable problems and questions for any 
system of class adjudication. Yet the focus of the class action literature has 
largely ignored the theoretical “elephant in the room” and as a result has 
failed to recognize the tension between a collectivist procedural device and 
an adversarial system premised on notions of process-based individual 
autonomy. All of this leads to focus on and acceptance of our alternative 
model of the class action, which seeks to minimize encroachment upon 
process-based autonomy inherent in existing models while simultaneously 
protecting the integrity of the democratic process. Only by keeping these 
twin objectives in mind can we be reasonably certain that the class action 
will operate to further, rather than retard, the values of individualism that 
lie at the heart of our civil justice system. 
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